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The SECURE Collaboration Model
S. Terzis, W. Wagealla, C. English, A. McGettrick, and P. Nixon
The Global and Pervasive Computing Group
Dept. of Computer and Information Sciences
University of Strathclyde
Abstract. The SECURE1 collaboration model builds upon the previ-
ously developed theoretical trust and risk models and addresses the is-
sues of managing the trust lifecycle. The theoretical aspects of the model
concentrate on the following issues:
1. The interpretation of trust values in context for decision making pur-
poses, namely trust exploitation. This process relies on the deﬁnition
of context and the use of contextual parameterisation of collabora-
tion requests.
2. The revision of trust values in the light of evaluated evidence about
principals’ behaviour, starting from complete lack of evidence in the
case of unknown principals, namely trust formation and evolution.
These processes rely on the separate processing of direct and indi-
rect evidence and the introduction of the notion of attraction, which
determines the eﬀects that evidence has on the trustworthiness of a
principal.
Trust exploitation, formation and evolution all are centered around a
close relationship between trust and risk. In order to operationalise the
theoretical collaboration model:
1. A trusting collaboration architecture is described. The architecture
supports the decision making, the trust evaluation and the risk eval-
uation processes. It also places particular emphasis on the collection
of evidence, requiring an evidence gatherer and an evidence store.
2. A layered model for the organisation of trust related information
is introduced, namely the trust information structure. The struc-
ture enables processing of indirect evidence in a way that avoids the
problems documented in literature.
Finally, the collaboration model is applied to two case studies, a smart
space scenario and a e-purse scenario in order to demonstrate its vari-
ous concepts. A comparison of the model to the state of the art and a
discussion of areas for future work concludes this appendix.
1 Introduction
Global computing is characterised by large numbers of roaming entities and the
absence of a globally available ﬁxed infrastructure [47]. In such an environment
1 SECURE (Secure Collaboration among Ubiquitous Roaming Entities, IST-2001-
32486) is an EU FET Research Project funded under the Global Computing Ini-
tiative.
entities meet and need to collaborate with little known or even unknown entities.
Entering any kind of collaboration requires entities to make security decisions
about the type and level of access to their resources they will provide to their
collaborators. In traditional environments with clearly deﬁned administrative
boundaries and limited entity movement security decisions are usually delegated
to a centralised administrative authority [48, 34, 38]. In the global computing en-
vironment no single entity can play this role and as a result traditional techniques
that statically determine the access rights of the entities are not an option. En-
tities are required to make their own security decisions. Moreover, the absence
of a globally available security infrastructure means that these decisions need
to be made autonomously. At the same time the sheer number of the roaming
entities means that it is not feasible to gather and maintain information about
all of them. Consequently, in the global computing environment decisions have
to be made in the absence of complete knowledge of the operating environment.
Autonomous decision making with partial information is something that humans
have to deal with on a day-to-day basis. To help them with the complexity of
such a task humans have developed the notion of trust [18]. Although trust is an
elusive concept and a number of deﬁnitions have been proposed for it, it is our
belief that it can be modelled to adequate detail to facilitate security decision
making in global computing.
The potential advantages of the notion of trust in dealing with security decisions
have been recognised by a number of researchers as is demonstrated by research
in Trust Management systems [1, 4, 6, 13, 27, 30, 42, 51, 52]. Although, this work
is a move forward in security practice, most of it is based on the exchange of cer-
tiﬁcates between entities [4, 6, 27, 30, 42], and does not address the fundamental
issue of what trust is made of and consequently the related issue of how trust
can be formed. Furthermore, this approach provides very limited support for
the evolution of trust between entities in the form of certiﬁcate revocation. As
a result, this work lacks the support for autonomous decision-making and for
dynamism in trust evolution necessary for global computing.
Novel approaches have been proposed to address the weaknesses of certiﬁcate
based trust management [1, 13, 51, 52]. These approaches model explicitly the
trustworthiness of entities and support its formation and evolution based on
information gathered through personal interactions. As a result they are funda-
mentally diﬀerent to other work in trust management. They no longer consider
how to provide absolute protection against potential dangers, as is the case for
all security decisions. Instead, they accept that dangers are an intrinsic part of
any global computing system. Therefore, they attempt to use trust as a mecha-
nism for managing these dangers and of learning from past interactions in order
to improve protection. This fundamental change is reﬂected by the shift in the
discussion from security decisions to trusting decisions.
Even these approaches, though, have certain weaknesses. First, they assume a
global identiﬁcation system for entities. This is a very strong assumption to make
in the context of global computing. Second, few incorporate explicit notions of
risk (e.g. [16, 20]), and even in these cases the relationship between trust and
risk is not made clear or is left for future consideration. Trust and risk are
intrinsically related in the sense that there is no need for a trusting decision
unless there is risk involved. Third, very few of these approaches model explicitly
uncertainty, a consequence of decision making in the absence of total information.
The SECURE approach addresses all these weaknesses by focusing on recognition
rather than identiﬁcation of entities, modelling explicitly risk (see section 2.2
below) and uncertainty in the trust domain (see section 2.1 below).
In this appendix we go one step further in the SECURE approach and we de-
scribe its collaboration model. The collaboration model addresses issues of trust
lifecycle management, in particular the processes of trust formation, evolution
and exploitation. Its theoretical aspects are founded on the theoretical trust
model and the risk model. We introduce the notion of attraction to model the
eﬀects of new pieces of evidence on the trustworthiness of principals. Its oper-
ational aspects include a high-level collaboration architecture for trust lifecycle
management and the trust information structure for the organisation of trust
related information. A preliminary formalisation of the operational aspects en-
coded in the trust policy language provided by the formal trust model is also
included.
In the rest of the appendix, we start with a brief overview of the SECURE the-
oretical trust model in section 2.1 and the SECURE risk model in section 2.2.
This is followed by the description of our theoretical collaboration model, which
ﬁrst explores the relationship between trust and risk in section 3.1 and then
discusses in detail our approach to trust exploitation, trust evolution and trust
formation in sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. We then describe the operational
aspects of our collaboration model, focusing in turn on a collaboration architec-
ture in section 4.1, a structure for the management of trust related information
in section 4.2 and a discussion on the issues of evidence gathering in section 4.3.
Section 5 provides the formalisation of the operational aspect of our collabora-
tion model. In order to facilitate the understanding of our proposed model in
sections 6.1 and 6.2 we provide two case studies with the aim to demonstrate
its application. Finally, we provide a comparison of our proposed model to the
the state of the art in section 7 and conclude the appendix in section 8.
2 Trust and Risk in SECURE
2.1 The Theoretical Trust Model
The theoretical trust model [9–11] considers principals to be entities that either
have to make trusting decisions or are the subjects of these decisions. P is deﬁned
as the set of all principals. Trust reasoning for principals has two aspects. On
one hand decision making principals should be able to associate trust values to
other principals. T is deﬁned as the set of all these trust values. On the other
hand, principals should also be able to update their trust values in the light of
evidence. So, given the set of principals P and the set of trust values T the global
trust is deﬁned as a function m : P → P → T , where m(a)(b) ∈ T expresses a’s
trust in b.
Following an object-based model, the ability of each principal to reason about
trust is modelled as a trust box, which has some internal trust state S and
supports two operations:
– update: S × E −→ S, given a particular trust state S and some evidence E ,
an updated trust state is produced.
– trust: S ×P −→ T , given a particular state S and a principal P, the trust
value for the principal is returned.
The operation of each principal’s trust box is described by a local policy function
π, which relates principals to trust values and supports references 2. References
provide the ability for a principal to specify trust values as relations over the
trust values of other principals. This local policy π is deﬁned as:
π : (P → P → T ) → P → T . (1)
The collection of all the local policies deﬁnes a global trust policy:
Π : (P → P → T ) → (P → P → T ). (2)
This global trust policy is interpreted in terms of complete partial orders. If
the set of trust values T given an ordering relation  is a complete partial
order (c.p.o.) with a least element ⊥ (unknown), then the global trust m can be
calculated as the least-ﬁxed point of the global trust function Π. If Π is a -
continuous function then the existence of the least ﬁxed point is guaranteed . The
ordering relation  could represent the preciseness of trust information according
to its deﬁnition in [9]. Alternatively, it can be viewed as describing the amount
of trust information as is the case in the example of collecting observations, or
even to reﬂect the level of certainty in the trust values as is the case in the simple
trust setting example (see also [9]). From the point of view of the calculation
of the global trust function Π all these views are equivalent. The collection of
additional information, further iterations in the least ﬁxed point calculation, is in
fact reducing the uncertainty about the trust values of referenced principals and
leads to more precise trust information. In contrast, from a point of view of trust
evolution the diﬀerent views are not equivalent. The main diﬀerence between
them is that trust information is monotonically increasing as additional evidence
becomes available, while certainty is not. This is the case because additional
evidence contradicting our current opinion may in fact reduce our certainty in
the trust values. In this document we take the view that this relation refers to
2 Note that in [9] the term delegation is used instead of reference to denote the same
concept
level of certainty in the trust values and we refer to it as certainty ordering. We
will come back to this issue in section 3.3.
In addition to the , “more certainty” ordering relation on T , the model also
deﬁnes , “more trust”, which is equally essential. The  relation speciﬁes for
two trust values t1 and t2, which one expresses more trust. According to the
theoretical trust model the set of trust values T given the ordering  is complete
lattice.
In summary, the theoretical trust model requires that trust domain be deﬁned
as (T ,,), where  is an certainty ordering and  is a trust ordering , such
that (T ,) is a c.p.o. with a least element and (T ,) is a complete lattice.
2.2 The Risk Model
The risk model [3, 17, 45] considers each collaboration between principals as con-
sisting of a number of trust mediated actions. Each such action is an interaction
between two principals Pr and Pd, the requester and the decision-maker re-
spectively 3, and has a set of possible results or outcomes. Each outcome has an
associated risk. Risk is deﬁned as the likelihood of an outcome occurring and the
cost or beneﬁt this outcome incurs if it occurs. The risk of an outcome depends
on the trustworthiness of the requester Pr and certain parameters of the action
in question. Before each trust mediated action the decision-maker Pd must make
a trusting decision. This decision is based on the overall risk of the action in
question, which is some kind of combination of the risks of all its outcomes.
In the risk assessment of a particular action, the risk model takes the view
that the trustworthiness of the requester Pr aﬀects the likelihood of the various
outcomes and not their associated costs or beneﬁts. These in turn are determined
by the parameters of the action. For example, in the case of ﬁnancial transactions
the trustworthiness of the principals determines the chances of them paying their
debts, while the debt amount determines the speciﬁc costs or beneﬁts. At the
same time, the risk model recognises that the outcomes can be distributed over
a space that has a range of potential costs with corresponding probabilities.
For this purpose it introduces the concept of a cost-PDF to represent the risk
of each outcome, which is a probability density function with cost on the x-
axis. Note that in cost-PDFs, beneﬁts are represented as negative costs. Since
the trustworthiness of the principal aﬀects the likelihood of each outcome, the
risk of an outcome is represented by a set of cost-PDFs parameterised by the
principal’s trustworthiness (a family of cost-PDFs). The family of cost-PDFs
may be further parameterised by the parameters of the action.
At this point we should also point out a number of things:
1. The security decisions for each action are not necessarily binary, i.e. either
accept or reject the action.
3 Note that in previous documents the two principals have been referred to as the
initiator and the executor respectively
2. For each action a number of outcomes may occur at the same time and as
a result the decision making process needs to consider the risk of all these
outcomes.
3. It might take a signiﬁcant amount of time before the real outcome of an
action is known.
3 The Theoretical Collaboration Model
The aim of the collaboration model is to capture the dynamic aspects of the
trust model. These aspects address issues like how trust is formed, how it evolves
over time, how it is exploited in the decision making process and are collectively
referred to as trust lifecycle management. Our model builds upon the theoretical
trust model and the risk model described above. In particular, it exploits the
relationships between trust and risk to both facilitate and evaluate the decision
making process of the principals.
We deﬁne collaboration as a joint interaction between a set of two or more
principals P involving a set of one or more trust mediated actions A. Before
entering a collaboration each principal must make a trusting decision regarding
the level of access to its resources it will permit to other principals. From this
deﬁnition it should be clear that the collaboration and consequently the trusting
decisions may be very complex. In this document we simplify our approach by
only considering collaborations between two principals involving a single trust
mediated action. We call collaborations of this type simple.
3.1 The Relationship between Trust and Risk
As it is observed in [3], “there is no need to trust someone unless there is a risk
involved”. So, it is our premise that not only trust and risk mutually require
each other but in fact are so closely related that they reﬂect each other.
There are two alternative views of the relationship between trust and risk. On
one hand, we can view risk “driving” trust. According to this view, risk reﬂects
how vulnerable we are in a particular situation, or in other words how likely
is our current situation to lead to an accident or mishap, combined with the
severity or cost of this accident or mishap. In this case, our aim is to protect
ourselves by only exposing serious vulnerabilities to highly trusted collaborators.
In this context the trusting decision we have to make can be expressed as: in
a particular situation s, or in the context of a simple collaboration a particular
action a which entails a level of risk r, how trustworthy should a principal be in
order to be allowed to enter situation s or carry out action a? In this view the
level of risk determines the necessary level of required trustworthiness, i.e. risk
drives the decision making.
On the other hand, we can view trust “driving” risk. According to this view,
trust reﬂects the likelihood of a principal behaving well in a particular situation.
In this case, our aim is to protect ourselves by only collaborating with principals
that are likely to behave and as a result an interaction with them is not very
risky. In this context the trusting decision we have to make can be expressed
as: in a particular situation s, or a particular action a, involving a particular
principal p, how much risk are we willing to accept by allowing principal p to
enter situation s or carry out action a? In this view the level of trustworthiness
determines the level of acceptable risk, i.e. trust drives the decision making.
In particular situations one or the other of these alternative views seem more
appropriate. More speciﬁcally, it seems to be the case that the former view is
more natural in a safety critical systems setting, while the latter in a ﬁnancial
systems setting. The SECURE risk model has adopted the latter view. This is
also demonstrated by Figure 1, which is taken from [3].
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Fig. 1. The interface between trust and risk.
Figure 1 shows a ﬁrst attempt at determining the nature of the relation between
trust and risk from the point of view of the risk model. According to this ﬁgure
for each outcome oi of a particular action A, a -function takes as input the
family of cost-PDFs associated with oi and the trust value t associated with a
principal P and selects a single cost-PDF. The ⊕-function takes as input these
selected cost-PDFs, one for each outcome oi, and produces a decision for the
action. If the decision was to go ahead with the action then after the completion
of the interaction some feedback is produced. A ♦-function takes this feedback as
input and provides some information to the trust model. Although in this ﬁgure
the relationship between trust and risk is not very clearly speciﬁed, there are
two important observations that we should note. First, the -function requires
the existence of a mapping between trust values and cost-PDFs. Second, the
feedback loop requires that the results of any action carried out by a principal
be used as feedback regarding its trustworthiness.
Looking at the decision making process as is depicted in ﬁgure 1 combined with
the adopted view of risk, it is clear that the decision process relies on the ability
of the decision-maker to associate each principal to a risk proﬁle. The selected
cost-PDFs of the outcomes for each action describe this risk proﬁle. Moreover,
this proﬁle can also be seen as a proﬁle of how good or bad the behaviour of a
principal is expected to be in the context of the requested action. In this sense,
the trust values can be viewed as classiﬁers of principals, where each principal is
classiﬁed according to its expected behaviour in one of a number of groups. There
is one group for each trust value and all principals within a group have the same
trust value. This view of trust values as classiﬁers of principals has signiﬁcant
beneﬁts for the scalability of the decision making process. It allows the decision-
maker to keep only one risk proﬁle for each group of principals instead of one
for each principal. This is particularly important in a global computing setting,
where the number of principals is expected to be particularly high.
This approach dictates a very close relation between trust values and risk proﬁles.
In fact, every trust value must be associated to a single risk proﬁle. Addition-
ally, two diﬀerent trust values should be associated to diﬀerent risk proﬁles. If
this is not the case, then from a decision making point of view the two trust
values and subsequently the two sets of principals associated with them will be
indistinguishable. As a result, keeping both trust values is questionable. This
approach requires that the mapping between trust values and risk proﬁles is not
only a function but an injective or one-to-one function. Note that according to
the risk model (see section 2.2), the risk proﬁle of a principal for a particular
action is described as a set of cost-PDFs one for each outcome of the action.
These cost-PDFs are selected from the family of cost-PDFs associated to each
outcome. This injective function that maps trust values to risk proﬁles corre-
sponds to the -function of ﬁgure 1, which for each outcome of an action selects
one cost-PDF. Considering CPDFS to be the whole family of cost-PDFs, we
deﬁne this function as 4:
select : T → CPDFS (3)
At this point, we should point out that the number of trust values and con-
sequently risk proﬁles is dependent on the required granularity of the decision
making process. The larger the number of trust values the more able the decision-
maker is to discern variations in the expected behaviour of principals. This allows
ﬁner diﬀerentiation on the way principals are treated. However, there is a trade-
oﬀ between the granularity and the complexity of the decision making process.
A decision making process that exploits the ﬁner diﬀerentiation in the treatment
of principals is likely to be more complicated.
In a global computing environment characterised by the lack of complete in-
formation about principals, their classiﬁcation into similarly behaving groups
cannot be ﬁnal. As additional information about the behaviour of individual
principals becomes available the classiﬁcation needs to be evolve. The results of
this process may be twofold. It may lead to the re-classiﬁcation of the principal
into a diﬀerent group whose associated risk proﬁle is a more accurate predictor of
the principal’s behaviour. Additionally, it may even lead to a reconﬁguration of
the classiﬁcation scheme by updating the risk proﬁles associated to each group.
In this context, the two aspects of the evaluation process can be captured by the
following questions:
– Has each principal been classiﬁed to the correct group, i.e. is the trust value
for each principal correct?
– Is the risk proﬁle associated to each group correct, i.e. are the cost-PDFs for
each trust value correct?
Note that the answer to both of the above questions is with respect to the cur-
rently available evidence. Answering these questions in a general sense requires
complete knowledge of a principal’s behaviour. This is not feasible in most cases
in a global computing setting. The former aspect of the evaluation process can be
associated to the feedback loop of ﬁgure 1. We refer to this aspect of the process
as trust evaluation. Moreover, it becomes clear that a second feedback loop to
cost-PDFs is necessary to represent the latter aspect of the evaluation process.
We refer to this aspect of the process as risk evaluation. Since we only focus on
the dynamic aspects of trust and not of risk for the remainder of the discussion
we will centre our attention on the trust evaluation aspect of the process.
Within this context, we can view the feedback collected from the multiple cases
of an action as a proﬁle of observed behaviour for the requester with respect
to the action. This proﬁle can in turn be described as set of cost-PDFs one for
each outcome of the action, where the likelihood represents the proportion of
the total occurrences where this outcome occurred. Then, we could rephrase the
above trust evaluation question as follows:
4 An alternative view of this relationship is to view each cost-PDF as a function
parameterised by trust
– Which of the cost-PDFs predicts requester behaviour reﬂecting most closely
the observed behaviour?
Being able to use the answer to this question to determine the appropriate trust
value for the user requires an even stronger relationship between trust values
and risk proﬁles. Not only should we be able given any trust value to select a
risk proﬁle, but we should also be able given any risk proﬁle to select a trust
value. This will enable us to calculate the trustworthiness conveyed by a proﬁle
of observed behaviour by ﬁnding the risk proﬁle that most closely reﬂects it.
This requirement implies that mapping from trust values to risk proﬁles should
also be surjective or onto function too. As a result, the select function deﬁned
by equation 3 must be a bijection.
Introducing structure to the risk domain. So far in the discussion of the
relationship between trust and risk, we ignored the structure of the trust domain,
the set of trust values. According to our trust model the trust domain is deﬁned
as (T ,,), a set of values together with a certainty and a trust ordering (see
section 2.1). This, in combination with the fact that both the decision making
and trust evaluation processes require a very close relationship between trust
values and risk proﬁles, implies that the set of the risk proﬁles should reﬂect the
structure to the trust domain.
In the case of the trust ordering (), if we consider in the context of a particular
action a two trust values t1, t2 with respective risk proﬁles r1, r2 such that t1  t2
then r2 must represent less risk than r1. This means, according to our risk model,
that outcomes with lower costs and/or higher beneﬁts are more likely in proﬁle
r2 than in proﬁle r1 (see section 2.2). Note though that this particular view is
the result of risk model’s premise that the trustworthiness of a principal only
aﬀect the likelihood of the outcomes. Instead, we can take the more general view
that the trustworthiness of a principal can aﬀect both the likelihood and/or the
associated costs of the outcomes. In this case, we would expect that equally
likely outcomes will be associated with lower costs in proﬁle r2 than in proﬁle
r1. At this point we should note that in the current risk model, the case where
there are multiple costs possible for the same general outcome (e.g. failure) can
only be modelled with the introduction of a number of specialised outcomes (e.g.
disastrous failure and recoverable failure). However, as the variety of costs for
the general outcome increases this modelling approach becomes more awkward.
In the case of the certainty ordering () things are more complicated. The
source of the complication is the lack of a notion of uncertainty in our current
risk model. There are three ways of addressing these complications:
1. Ignore the certainty dimension of the trust values in both the decision making
and trust evaluation processes. In this approach if the trustworthiness of
two principals diﬀers only in terms of certainty then both principals will be
treated the same. At the same time, the trust evaluation process will only
aﬀect the trust dimension of the trust values leaving the certainty aspects
either completely unaﬀected or managed through external procedures.
2. Consider the certainty dimension of the trust values only in the decision
making process and not in the trust evaluation process. Following this ap-
proach the risk proﬁles reﬂect only the trust dimension of the trust values. As
a result, the decision making process cannot rely exclusively on the risk pro-
ﬁles. Instead it also requires the trust values themselves in order to consider
their certainty dimension. At the same time, the trust evaluation process
still only aﬀects the trust dimension of the trust values. Similarly to the ﬁrst
approach, this leaves the certainty aspects either completely unaﬀected or
managed through external procedures.
3. Introduce a notion of certainty to the risk model, which will allow considera-
tion of both trust dimensions in both processes. In this approach in contrast
to the second one, the risk proﬁles reﬂect both trust dimensions. As a result,
the decision making process can rely exclusively on the risk proﬁles. At the
same time, the trust evaluation process considers and aﬀects both trust di-
mensions. For example, as a result of the trust evaluation process the new
trust value may be diﬀerent only in terms of certainty and not in terms of
trustworthiness.
The ﬁrst approach is the least desirable of the three since it does not fully utilise
the structure of the trust domain in either process. The second approach is a
half way between the other two. On one hand, it does not ignore the certainty
content of the trust values during decision making as the ﬁrst one does. On
the other hand, it still considers the certainty aspect as external to the trust
evaluation process. As a result it still does not fully utilise the structure of the
trust domain in the trust evaluation process. The third approach fully utilises the
structure provided of the trust domain in both process. Moreover, it requires that
the risk proﬁles reﬂect relationships between the respective trust values both in
terms of trustworthiness and certainty. This requires a risk model that captures
uncertainty.
From the three approaches, we consider the third one as the most desirable,
mainly because of the requirements it places on the risk model. We believe
that a risk model incorporating uncertainty is more in tune with the global
computing setting that is characterised by high degrees of uncertainty about
the collaborators. Consequently, we focus the rest of the discussion on the third
approach.
Introducing uncertainty to the risk model. Our aim in this section is not
to describe a full model for uncertain risks. It is more to suggest ways in which
the current risk model can be extended to include uncertainty and to explain how
some of these suggestions were applied in the case studies described in section 6.
We can introduce uncertainty to the risk model by considering risk ranges instead
of speciﬁc risk values. A risk range can be seen as either a set containing a
number of distinct risk values, or provided that an ordering over set of risk
values is deﬁned 5, as an interval containing all the values between an upper
and a lower bound. In either case, the higher the number of included risk values
the more uncertain we are about the risk. As the number of included risk values
is reduced our certainty about risk increases reaching complete certainty at the
point when we have a speciﬁc risk value. In other words, we can compare risk
ranges in terms of uncertainty using the set or interval inclusion operator on their
included risk values. So, a risk range RR1 is more uncertain than risk range RR2
(RR2  RR1), if the set or risk values in RR2 is a subset of the set of risk values
in RR1.
Regarding the exact meaning of a risk range we could consider it to be that all the
included risk values are equally likely while all other risk values are considered
totally unlikely. Note that in the constructive method of deﬁning trust values as
intervals on a lattice of basic trust values, our trust model models certainty in
a similar way, as inverse set inclusion (see section 2.3 in [9]). Moreover, it uses
the same meaning for the intervals, i.e. considering all included trust values as
equally likely. We can easily extend our current risk model to incorporate the
above approach. We can associate a range of cost-PDFs instead of a single cost-
PDF to each outcome of each action for each trust value. In this way we can now
easily reﬂect the full structure of the trust domain on the risk domain. We can
see the certainty ordering of the trust domain as deﬁning an inverse uncertainty
ordering on the risk domain.
Following this approach results in some changes in the decision making and the
trust evaluation processes. In the decision making process instead of considering
a single risk proﬁle for a principal we will have to consider a range of likely
proﬁles. Any decision taken must acknowledge this fact. Furthermore, the trust
evaluation process will have to decide on the appropriateness of the current
trust value not only in terms of trustworthiness but also in terms of certainty.
In terms of certainty the issue is whether any of the risk proﬁles of the range
can be safely excluded (certainty increase) or if additional proﬁles need to be
included (certainty reduction).
In section 2.2 we pointed out that risk is the combination of the likelihood of an
outcome occurring and the cost it incurs. Taking this into consideration we can
deﬁne two special cases of the above approach:
1. The case where the uncertainty is limited to the costs of the outcomes while
their likelihoods are certain. In this case we could use a cost-PDF as deﬁned
in [3] to represent the range of likely costs of each outcome of an action for
each trust value. This cost-PDF combined with the certain likelihood of the
particular outcome give us the risk proﬁle. In section 6.1 we apply this spe-
5 In contrast to the trust values it seems more natural to deﬁne a complete order of
risk values. For example, if we deﬁne risk values as the product of the likelihood
and the cost of an outcome (both represented by real numbers), then the risk value
ordering is just the < relation on real numbers.
cial case approach to a smart space application scenario. More speciﬁcally,
we consider a single action, get user location information. This action has a
single outcome, loss of user privacy. The range of costs and beneﬁts of this
outcome are determined by the cost or beneﬁt of a meeting with this partic-
ular user. We then follow the constructive method mentioned above to both
determine the trust values and their associated risk proﬁles (cost-PDFs).
The associated risk proﬁles of the trust value intervals are constructed by
considering the corresponding risk proﬁles of the included basic trust values
as equally likely, averaging of the respective cost-PDFs.
2. The case where the uncertainty is limited to the likelihoods of the outcomes
while their costs are certain. In this case, we could represent the risk proﬁle
of each outcome of each action for each trust value as an interval of likeli-
hoods, i.e. an interval within the (0, 1) interval, combined with the certain
cost. In section 6.2 we apply this special case approach to an e-purse applica-
tion scenario. More speciﬁcally, we consider a single action, e-cash payment,
that has two outcomes, valid and invalid e-cash, each with a speciﬁc cost
determined by the amount of the transaction. Users are considered reliable
for transactions up to a certain amount. This means that there is no chance
of invalid e-cash for any payments up to that amount. Users are considered
unreliable for transactions above a certain amount. This means that there
is no chance of valid e-cash for any payments above that amount. The trust
values are intervals over the range of e-cash transactions determined by the
thresholds of reliable and unreliable behaviour. The level of uncertainty is
represented by the size of the interval. In the area of uncertain behaviour
the likelihood of invalid and valid e-cash range from 0 to 1. In all cases the
risk proﬁle is parameterised by the amount of the transaction.
Concluding remarks. In conclusion, in order to support the decision making
and the trust evaluation processes the relationship between trust values and
risk proﬁles needs to be deﬁned as a bijective function from trust values to
risk proﬁles. We call this function select() (see equation 3). In fact select() is
core to the decision making process, while its inverse select−1() is core to the
trust evaluation process. Such a close relationship between trust values and risk
proﬁles requires that the risk proﬁles reﬂect the structure of the trust domain,
both in terms of the trustworthiness and certainty. Specialised examples of how
this requirement can be satisﬁed are provided in the two case studies of section 6.
3.2 Trust Exploitation
Trust exploitation is deﬁned as the interpretation of trust values in context. It
acknowledges the situational character of trust. For example, Bob may be trusted
to drive a car but may not be trusted to cook a decent meal. Moreover, Bob may
be trusted to drive a car when he is sober, but not after a couple of drinks. We
could probably think of a variety of situations like the given examples in which
our trust in Bob diﬀers. The important observation is that if the trustworthiness
of a principal varies depending on the situation, then the decision making process
should take the current situation into account. So, in this section we discuss how
various situations/contexts can be captured in a way that allows the proper
exploitation of trust in the decision making process.
Before we delve into the discussion we should ﬁrst deﬁne context. There are a
number of deﬁnitions of context in the literature [7, 2, 37, 40]. In fact context-
aware computing is a research area receiving a lot of attention in recent years
[12, 15, 22, 35, 36, 39]. Dey’s deﬁnition of context is one of the most widely used
in the context aware computing literature. He deﬁnes context as:
Any information that can be used to characterise the situation of an entity. An
entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction
between a user and an application, including the user and application them-
selves[15].
From this deﬁnition it should be clear that there is a variety of diﬀerent types of
context we can consider. However, as Dey pointed out not all types of context are
equally important [15]. The most important types are considered to be: location,
identity, time and activity.
If we consider Dey’s deﬁnition from a SECURE point of view, we can see that
from the four important types identity is central. The trust model identiﬁes
principals and assesses their trustworthiness separately. Taking this into account,
in SECURE we deﬁne context as:
Deﬁnition 1 A situational modiﬁer which aﬀects the way principals behave.
In general, the decision making process depends on the expected behaviour of
a principal as it is reﬂected in its risk proﬁle (see section 3.1). According to
deﬁnition 1 context aﬀects the behaviour of principals. In order for this eﬀect
to be taken into account in the decision making process, context should in fact
aﬀect directly or indirectly the risk proﬁles on which this process depends. Con-
sequently, the eﬀect of context can be threefold:
1. Context aﬀects the risk analysis changing the risk proﬁles associated to each
trust value. This results to diﬀerent expectations for principals’ behaviour.
2. Context aﬀects the principals’ trustworthiness. Since according to the risk
model the trust values of principals parameterise the risk proﬁles, this results
in context indirectly aﬀecting the expectations for principals’ behaviour.
3. Context aﬀects the mapping of trust values to risk proﬁles, changing the
risk proﬁle selected by a trust value. This again results in context indirectly
aﬀecting the expectations for principals’ behaviour.
At this point, we should note a couple of things. First, from the discussion in
section 3.1 of the relationship between trust and risk, it should be clear that
the above three cases refer to alternative ways in which context can aﬀect the
operation of the select() function (see equation 3). In the ﬁrst case the context
aﬀects the range of the function. In the second case it aﬀects the domain of
the function. In the third case it aﬀects the calculation of the function. Second,
since the risk model associates separate risk proﬁles to each trust mediated
action, a separate family of cost-PDFs, actions already deﬁne a context for the
principals’ behaviour. In fact actions can seen as deﬁning the activity type of
context mentioned above. As a result, although the trust and risk models do
not incorporate explicit notions of context, they already implicitly take into
consideration two of the four important types of it. Moreover, the presentation
of the select() function so far was in the single context of a single action. As
a result it provided quite a simplistic view of its role. If we try to extend this
view to include multiple contexts of a single action then we are faced with the
challenge of how to capture the contextual variations of trust in a way that
facilitates the above mentioned three cases. The challenge becomes more serious
if we want also to consider a number of actions, as would be the case in most
applications.
The contextual variations within a single action can be easily captured through
the parameterisation of actions in our current models. In this case, for each ac-
tion the application developer will have to determine a set of parameters such
that their values can capture the whole range of contextual variations. In the
simplest case, there could be a single parameter whose values represent all the
diﬀerent contexts. Although simple, this approach becomes diﬃcult to manage
in situations where the number of diﬀerent contexts is large. An alternative ap-
proach would be to separate diﬀerent types of context, e.g. time and location,
and associate a parameter to each particular type. This approach is more man-
ageable, since it separates the diﬀerent contextual concerns.
The parameterisation of actions can support all three of the above cases. In
the ﬁrst case where context aﬀects the risk proﬁles, we could use the action
parameters to parameterise the family of cost-PDFs or the range of risk proﬁles
associated to each action. In this case, we can refer to the parameters as risk
parameters. In the decision making process the risk parameters would determine
the exact nature of the cost-PDF family or range of risk proﬁles before the
application of the select() function. The rest of the process will remain the same
as was described in section 3.1. In the third case where the context aﬀects the
mapping of trust values to risk proﬁles, we could use the action parameters
to parameterise the select() function. In this case, assuming that CxtParams
denotes the contextual parameters, the function will have to be redeﬁned as
follows:
select : T × CxtParams → CPDFS (4)
The second case, where context aﬀect the trust values used by the select() func-
tion, requires the trust domain to somehow capture context. There are two al-
ternative approaches:
1. Introduce context explicitly to the trust model. This approach requires each
trust value to be contextualised, i.e. associated to a particular context T [cxt].
Consequently, the update function of the trust box (see section 2.1) will have
to be redeﬁned to take the context into account. In the decision making pro-
cess the trust values provided to the select() function would be contextu-
alised according to the action parameters, while the rest of the process will
remain the same.
2. Exploit the internal structure of the trust values to capture context. In this
approach the trust model is oblivious of context. Instead, the trust val-
ues are multi-dimensional reﬂecting the contextual diﬀerences of principals’
trustworthiness. In the decision making process the trust values would have
to be contextualised before they are provided to the select() function. Since,
the various dimensions of the trust values reﬂect contextual variations, the
contextualisation process can be seen as a projection function that selects
only the relevant dimensions. The action parameters determine the exact
nature of the contextualisation. In the decision making process, the trust
values provided to the select() function would be contextualised, while the
rest of the process will remain unchanged. Note that in the general case the
contextualisation could be quite complex. For example, in the case where
each dimension refers to diﬀerent independent context, the contextualisa-
tion function will be a straight forward projection picking the appropriate
dimension. While in the case where diﬀerent contexts are dependent on each
other, the contextualisation function will not only pick the the appropriate
dimensions but also apply diﬀerent weights to them. These weights will re-
ﬂect how closely related the selected contexts are to the current one. Finally,
each dimension may not reﬂect a particular context. Instead, it may reﬂect a
particular aspect of principal behaviour, e.g. benevolence. These aspects will
be relevant to diﬀerent context with a diﬀerent contribution. In this case the
contextualisation will just apply diﬀerent weights to the diﬀerent dimensions
reﬂecting their respective relevance for the current context.
These two approaches for the contextualisation of trust values can be extended
to capture also contextual variations between actions. In fact, this only requires
that the context considered for the contextualisation of the trust values includes
the action too, and does not require any changes to the decision making process.
From the two approaches for the contextualisation of trust values we prefer the
second one, since it does not require any changes to our trust model. However,
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches are currently
not very clear to us. This is an issue we are planning to investigate further in
the future.
We should point out, that in both of the approaches for the contextualisation
of the trust values, the strong relationship between trust and risk discussed in
section 3.1 refers to contextualised trust and risk. However, if we take the view
that certain contexts may be related, then the strong relationship between con-
textualised trust and risk should also reﬂect contextual relationships. Moreover,
the relationship also dictates that the trust evaluation process must be con-
textualised. This means, that if contextualised trust values are the input in the
decision making process, i.e. only certain dimensions with a particular weight are
considered, then the trust evaluation process should only aﬀect these dimensions
and to a degree that reﬂects their respective weights. This requirement intro-
duces some serious complications to the trust evaluation process. So, in order to
simplify matters the discussion in the following sections is restricted within the
context of a single action and does not consider contextual variations with that
action. The removing of these restrictions is an issue left for further investigation
in the future.
The discussion so far, has been restricted within a single application context.
If we consider multiple applications sharing trust information, then the appli-
cations themselves deﬁne the context within which their trust values need to
be interpreted. We refer to contextual variations in behaviour within a single
application as internal context, while we refer to contextual variations between
applications as external context. In the case of external context, the transfer of
trust values from one application to the other requires their contextualisation.
This is achieved through a mapping between their respective contexts. This con-
text mapping can be taken into account during the contextualisation of the trust
values as discussed above. In fact, the projection of relevant dimensions of the
trust values combined with their weighting is a form of internal context mapping.
Note though that transferring trust values between applications is not just an
issue of contextualisation. In the general case it will also involve a translation of
trust values from one trust domain to another.
In summary, our trust exploitation model considers context as situational varia-
tions of principals’ behaviour. It considers two types of context, internal (intra-
application) and external (inter-application). The current model focuses on in-
ternal context, which it encodes by principal, action and action parameters. It
considers the eﬀects of context on the decision making process along three di-
mensions: risk proﬁles, mapping between trust and risk, and trust values. The
last of the three dimensions is referred to as contextualisation of the trust values
and is the basis for the extension of the model to multiple actions and even
multiple applications. The model approaches the contextualisation of the trust
values by exploiting their internal structure and deﬁning an internal context
mapping.
3.3 Trust Formation and Evolution
Trust formation refers to how evidence creates trust, while trust evolution refers
to how trust values change in the light of new evidence. In our collaboration
model we consider trust formation and evolution as similar processes. They
both receive evidence, evaluate it with respect to the current trust value and
produce a new trust value taking into account the results of the evaluation.
Both processes may also include a phase of evidence collection, during which the
principal actively seeks additional evidence. There is only one diﬀerence in the
case of formation compared to evolution:
– The current trust value is “unknown”, i.e. the ⊥ element of the certainty
ordering 6.
If we look back into the theoretical trust model (see section 2.1) it should be clear
that the update function of the trust box does in fact refer to the formation or
evolution of the trust values. The state of the trust box is updated in the light of
new evidence. Moreover, the trust evaluation process as described in section 3.1
illustrates also in part the trust evolution process.
Diﬀerent types of evidence. In general, evidence refers to any kind of infor-
mation about principals’ behaviour. We call the principal in question the subject
of the evidence. Evidence can be characterised as either direct or indirect. The
former refers to evidence about a subject’s behaviour that has been directly
witnessed by a principal, the witness. The latter refers to evidence about a sub-
ject’s behaviour that has not been directly witnessed. In fact, it refers to third
party information about a subject’s behaviour. From these deﬁnitions it should
be clear that the characterisation of evidence as direct or indirect is relative,
in other words direct evidence propagated to another principal becomes indi-
rect. The distinction between direct and indirect evidence is quite important.
The validity of direct evidence is unquestionable and should be treated as fact,
while indirect evidence can be questionable and should be treated as an opinion
about facts. Consequently the validity of indirect evidence depends heavily on
the source of the information, the principal expressing the opinion. This diﬀer-
ence suggests that during trust evolution indirect evidence must be treated with
caution, as diﬀerent principals may evaluate diﬀerently the same facts. Moreover,
some principals may be even distort the facts.
The trust management literature identiﬁes three types of evidence:
1. Observations. They refer to direct evidence. They are personal experi-
ences usually gathered through interaction with a principal 7. The action
feedback of ﬁgure 1, refers in fact to the generation of observations that
takes place at the completion of an interaction. According to our model,
an interaction between two principals is in the form of trust-mediated ac-
tions. Each of these actions has a set of possible outcomes, each with its own
costs or beneﬁts (see section 2.2). At the same time, our model prescribes
6 This does not have to be always the case. In the general case trust formation may
start from an initial trust value T =⊥. In any case though, the initial trust value has
to be quite uncertain, i.e. it has to be close to the bottom of the certainty ordering
complete partial order.
7 An extended view of observations may also include observables, indications of a
subject’s behaviour while interacting with another principal.
that diﬀerences in the trustworthiness of principals represent diﬀerences in
their expected behaviour proﬁles, i.e. their risk proﬁles. These diﬀerences
demonstrate themselves as either diﬀerences in the likelihoods of the various
outcomes and/or diﬀerences in the incurred costs or beneﬁts. Hence, we take
the view that an observation is the pair of the outcome that occurred at the
end of the interaction and its observed cost or beneﬁt. This approach allows
us to distinguish between proﬁles of expected behaviour that produce the
same outcomes with same likelihood, but incur diﬀerent costs or beneﬁts.
For example, consider an email spam ﬁltering application that decides if an
email should be classiﬁed as spam or not depending on the trustworthiness
of the sender. In this scenario, we have two diﬀerent principals P1 and P2,
that send us spam messages with same likelihood, e.g. 1 in 4 messages is
spam. But principal P1 usually sends us small text messages a few bytes in
size, while principal P2 usually sends us messages with attachments many
megabytes in size. In this case, the risk associated to messages from principal
P2 is signiﬁcantly higher to that associated to messages from principal P1.
So, in this scenario the evaluation of our interactions with each principal
needs to consider both the outcome, spam or not, and its cost, message size.
2. Recommendations. They refer to indirect evidence passed between a prin-
cipal W , the witness, and a principal R, the receiver, describing a judgement
on principal S, the subject. In the general case, this evidence can take any
form, but in this document we only consider the case of a trust value ex-
pressing W ’s trust in S.
3. Reputation. It refers also to indirect evidence that takes the form of a
measure of the overall trustworthiness of a subject S. This measure can be
expressed as:
r(S) =
∑
Pi∈C
m(Pi)(s) (5)
Note that we only assume a community of principals C, which is a subset of
the whole principal population P. This is in line with the lack of complete
information characterising global computing.
Exchanging trust values between principals. Both recommendations and
reputation are based on the ability of principals to exchange trust values. For
any such exchange to be meaningful the trust values need to share a common
representation and all principals need to have a shared understanding of their
meaning. If we consider the variety of potential application scenarios each with
its speciﬁc requirements for trust values (see [8]), it becomes very diﬃcult to
come up with a common trust domain for all of them. So, in line with the
discussion on the contextualisation of the trust values in section 3.2, we assume
that each application sets the boundary within which the common format and
the shared understanding of the trust values is guaranteed. For exchanges of
trust values over this boundary, i.e. between diﬀerent applications, we assume
that there are no guarantees.
At this point, it is imperative to clarify what do we mean by a shared under-
standing of the trust values. A strict interpretation of shared understanding
would require that provided with the same trust value in the same context, all
principals would make the same decision. Such an interpretation would require
that besides the same format of trust values, all principals share:
– The same structure of the trust value domain.
– The same trust contextualisation process.
– The same select() function (see equation 3).
– The same risk analysis, i.e. risk proﬁles.
– The same access control policy.
We ﬁnd such an interpretation unnecessarily over restrictive, particularly in the
context of global computing, which is characterised by the autonomy of entities.
In fact, it could be argued that the access control policy and the risk analysis
are characteristic of the disposition of an entity and as a result should vary.
The argument regarding the contextualisation process and the select() function
is not as clear cut. It should be clear however, that a shared structure for the
trust value domain is the minimum requirement for the meaningful exchange of
trust values between principals. Hence in this document we take the view that
all principals share the same structure of the trust value domain. This means
the following:
1. There is a single format of trust values.
2. Each dimension of the trust values represents the same thing for each prin-
cipal. For example, if the trust values are (t1, t2), then t1 always refers to
the trustworthiness of a principal as a collaborator and t2 always refers to
the trustworthiness of a principal as a recommender.
3. The value range of each dimension of the trust values is the same for all
principals. In the above example we could have that for all principals both
t1 and t2 ∈ (0, 1).
4. The trust and certainty orderings are the same for all principals. So, if t1  t2
and t1  t2 for principal Pi then t1  t2 and t1  t2 for all other principals.
The above assumptions guarantee to a certain degree meaningful exchange of
evidence in the form of trust values between principals within a particular appli-
cation. Note, that in particular application scenarios the developer may want to
provide stronger guarantees. In general, it is the case that the stronger the guar-
antees the more meaningful the exchange of trust values becomes. In any case,
it is imperative that the application developers are very clear about the pro-
vided guarantees. Moreover, the exploitation, formation and evolution processes
should not make any assumptions above these guarantees.
The value of evidence. The three diﬀerent types of evidence, although all
valuable for trust formation and evolution, do not have the same value. In gen-
eral, we would expect direct evidence to be a lot more valuable than indirect
evidence due to its unquestionable character. This means that we would consider
observations to be the most valuable type of evidence and as a result to carry
the most weight in the evolution process. In fact, we could even see situations
where observations would be the only type of evidence considered. The problem
with observations is that they require the participation of the witness, making
them the most diﬃcult type to collect. It usually takes a lot of time before any
principal acquires adequate personal experience.
The exchange of experiences between principals can enhance their perception
of the world, especially in cases where personal experience is limited. In these
cases recommendations and reputation can be particularly valuable. However,
their value is predicated on the assumption that the subject is likely to behave
similarly towards both the witness and the receiver. If the assumption does not
hold, then the exchanged experiences are worthless. In the general case, there are
no guarantees that this assumption holds. Identifying which principals witness
similar behaviour from certain subjects is in most cases very diﬃcult. In any
case, the fact that exchanged experiences are indirect types of evidence means
that the trustworthiness of their source aﬀects their validity and as a result their
value. This is acknowledged in the literature and has led to the introduction of
the concept of discounting for recommendations [26, 28, 50]. Discounting usually
takes the form of an operator which considers the receiver’s perception of the
integrity or trustworthiness of the witness, namely the trust in the recommender.
We should note here that this type of trust is usually considered as separate
from the trust that is normally associated to principals. It reﬂects how good the
principal is as a source of recommendations, rather than how likely it is to behave
well. The value of a recommendation as evidence depends on the certainty of
our trust in the recommender. The more certain it is the more valuable the
recommendations are. If we are completely certain about a recommender’s trust
then its recommendations become as valuable as our observations.
There are two alternative approaches to modelling trust in the recommender:
1. As a proper trust value. According to this approach exchanging recommen-
dations is just another form of interaction with a principal and as a result
a similar decision making and trust evaluation processes should be followed.
In this case, the trust in the recommender is maintained with similar ex-
ploitation, formation and evolution processes to the main trust. This type of
trust in the recommender could form either an orthogonal second trust value
domain, or a separate dimension of the main trust value domain. In either
case, these trust values should encode both trustworthiness and certainty
and follow the same structure as the main trust value domain in terms of
the orderings (see section 2.1).
2. As a speciﬁc measure of integrity that is not a proper trust value. According
to this approach the whole issue of exchanging recommendations is com-
pletely orthogonal to the other types of interaction between principals. As a
result, we have completely separate processes for its management in which
viewing trust in the recommender as a proper trust value only introduces
unnecessary complexity.
We believe that the former approach is more desirable since it allows us to
consider trust in the recommender and main trust within a single framework. It
also lets us to explicitly model certainty in the recommenders.
This approach, however, raises a number of issues regarding the discounting
operator that should adjust recommendations in the light of the trust in their
source. First, using the term discounting for such an operator is misleading.
This operator aims to adjust the trust values we receive as recommendations,
either by lowering or raising them. More speciﬁcally, if we notice that particular
principals tend to be quite lenient in their evaluations of subject behaviour, then
we should lower their recommendations. While, if we notice that they are quite
strict, then we should raise them. Note that this is in line with the notion of
semantic distance between recommendation and experience as deﬁned in [1]. So,
we refer to such operator as an adjusting operator and to the process of applying
the operator as recommendation adjustment.
Second, the fact that the trust values and the trust in the recommender encode
both trustworthiness and certainty, means that the adjusting operator should
also work on both these dimensions. In this case the operator could also been
seen as the means for making recommendations as valuable as observation. How-
ever, at present the exact way in which the operator should work is not very
clear. Consequently, this is an issue open for further research. We should note,
though, that we incorporate the adjusting operator in our model. We introduce
recommendation adjustment as the ﬁrst step in their evaluation process.
Although, the use of an adjusting operator that takes into consideration the trust
in the recommender may be used to increase the value of recommendations, in the
case of reputation things are even more complicated. Since, reputation aggregates
a number of recommendations in order to follow the same approach we need
to adjust each constituent recommendation. This requires that we know exactly
which opinions were combined to produce the measure of overall trustworthiness,
who were the sources of these opinions and how much each of them contributed
to the overall measure. If this is the case, then reputation has the same value
as individual recommendations. However, in most cases, this level of detailed
information is not available, and as such reputation is not very valuable for
evolution. This is the main reason why reputation is not further considered in
this document and the SECURE project as a whole.
Evidence evaluation. Evidence evaluation is the ﬁrst step of the trust for-
mation and evolution process. In order to model the eﬀects of new evidence on
our current trust value we introduce the notion of attraction. When new evi-
dence becomes available we expect the current trust value Tcurr to change to a
new trust value Tnew that somehow reﬂects the new evidence. In other words
we expect the new evidence to attract the current trust value towards it. Thus,
attraction is the measure of the impact evidence has on the current trust value.
In this context, we can view the evidence evaluation process as a function, which
assuming that Evd is the set of evidence, and Attr is the set of attractions, is
deﬁned as follows:
evaluate : Evd× T → Attr (6)
Since, according to the theoretical trust model our trust values reﬂect both
trust and certainty, we can express the impact of attraction in both trust and
certainty terms. Therefore, we can view attraction as a two-dimensional measure
consisting of a trust dimension (τ) and an certainty dimension (σ). On each
dimension attraction can be characterised:
– In the certainty dimension as either reinforcing or contradicting. In the for-
mer case, the new evidence cannot increase the certainty of the current trust
value, i.e. Tcurr  Tnew. In the latter case, the new evidence cannot reduce
the certainty of the current, trust value, Tnew  Tcurr.
– In the trust dimension as either positive or negative. In the former case,
the new evidence cannot reduce the trustworthiness of the current trust
value Tcurr  Tnew. In the latter case, the new evidence cannot increase the
trustworthiness of the current trust value Tnew  Tcurr.
We refer to the above characterisation of attraction as the direction of the at-
traction. The reason for this is that if we consider a trust domain (T ,,),
then these characterisations are excluding a number of elements of T producing
a subset of acceptable trust values in terms of certainty and trust respectively.
So, if we deﬁne Tσ, Tτ ⊆ T to be the set of acceptable trust values in terms of
certainty and trust respectively, then the characterisations dictate that the new
trust value must belong to the intersection of these sets, Tnew ∈ Tσ ∩ Tτ . Or in
other words, they determine the direction we should move on the trust ordering
lattice or the certainty ordering c.p.o. (see section 2.1) to ﬁnd our new trust
value Tnew.
Recommendation evaluation. Firstly, we should remind the reader that recom-
mendations are in the form of trust values. Note that we assume that in the
case of recommendations, the adjustment process has already taken place. As
a result, we can evaluate a recommendation, Rec, by taking advantage of the
structure of the trust domain (T ,,) and directly comparing it to the current
trust value in terms of certainty, , and trust, . This comparison will determine
the direction of its attraction as follows:
– In terms of certainty, we calculate the greatest lower bound (glb) of Tcurr
and Rec. Note that because (T,) is a complete partial order with a least
element, the glb of any two trust values t1, t2 ∈ T is guaranteed to exist.
Then, there are three cases:
1. If the glb(Tcurr, Rec) = Tcurr, then the attraction of the evidence is
reinforcing.
2. If the glb(Tcurr, Rec) = Rec, then the attraction of the evidence is still
reinforcing, but in this case Rec does not really add anything to our
current trust value and can be safely ignored.
3. Otherwise, the attraction of the evidence is contradicting.
In both the ﬁrst and the third of these cases the new trust value Tnew must
have the properties: glb(Tcurr, Rec)  Tnew and Tnew  Tcurr.
– In terms of trust, Tcurr and Rec are either comparable or incomparable.
1. If they are comparable, then:
• If Tcurr  Rec, then the attraction of the evidence is positive.
• If Rec  Tcurr, then the attraction of the evidence is negative.
Note that in this case the new trust value Tnew must be inside the interval
[Tcurr, Rec] or [Rec, Tcurr] respectively.
2. If they are not comparable, then instead of comparing Tcurr and Rec we
compare Tcurr to either the glb or the least upper bound (lub) of Tcurr
and Rec. Note that because of the fact that the (T,) is a complete
lattice, both the glb and the lub of any two trust values t1, t2 ∈ T are
guaranteed to exist. The choice between the glb and lub is a dispositional
characteristic of the principals. According to this characteristic principals
are classiﬁed as either trusting, those selecting the lub, or distrusting,
those selecting the glb. Then there are the following two cases:
(a) If the glb was selected, then the attraction of the evidence is negative
and the new trust value Tnew must be inside the interval deﬁned by
the glb and the current trust value Tcurr, Tnew ∈ [glb(Tcurr, Rec), Tcurr].
(b) If the lub was selected, then the attraction of the evidence is positive
and the new trust value Tnew must be inside the interval deﬁned by
the current trust value Tcurr and the lub, Tnew ∈ [Tcurr, lub(Tcurr, Rec)].
The above determines the direction of the attraction, but it does not determine
the value of attraction, ‖attr‖. Our trust model does not provide us with a
measure of distance between trust values, and as a result cannot be used for
determining the value of the attraction. However, in section 3.1 we required a
very close relationship between trust values and risk proﬁles. We also deﬁned
a select() function (see equation 3), which maps trust values to risk proﬁles.
Here, we exploit the select() function combined with the deﬁnition of a notion
of risk proﬁle distance to determine the value of attraction. More speciﬁcally,
assuming two discrete cost-PDFs C1 and C2, representing risk proﬁles R1 and
R2 respectively we deﬁne their distance as:
diff(C1, C2) =
∑
∀x∈C
| Pr1(x)− Pr2(x) | (7)
where Pr1(x) and Pr2(x) are the probabilities of cost x according to C1 and
C2 respectively, and C is the range of potential costs and beneﬁts. In this case,
the value of a recommendation’s Rec attraction, must be proportionate to the
distance of the risk proﬁles, cost-PDFs, associated to Tcurr and Rec:
‖attr‖ ∝ diff(select(Tcurr), select(Rec)) (8)
The exact function for the calculation of the value is up to the application
developer to deﬁne.
In summary, the direction of the attraction determines the direction of movement
on the trust ordering complete lattice and the certainty ordering c.p.o. While
the value of the attraction determines the distance of movement. The bigger the
attraction value is the bigger the movement has to be. In other words, the bigger
the value of the attraction the more likely we are to move away from the current
trust value.
Observation evaluation. At ﬁrst, we should remind the reader that observations
comprise of the observed outcome and its incurred cost or beneﬁt. The evaluation
of observations in general can take the following two forms:
1. Direct Evaluation. In this case the attraction of an observation is charac-
terised as positive if the observed outcome incurred a beneﬁt and negative
otherwise. Further, it is characterised as reinforcing if the likelihood of the
observation, Obs, according to the risk proﬁle of the current trust value,
Prselect(Tcurr)(Obs) ≥ 50%. Otherwise, it is contradicting. Its value should
be proportionate to the distance of the likelihood of the observation accord-
ing to the risk proﬁle of the current trust value from 50%,
‖attr‖ ∝| Prselect(Tcurr)(Obs)− 50% | (9)
This form of observation evaluation is demonstrated in the e-purse scenario
(see section 6.2).
2. Indirect Evaluation. In this case, we ﬁrst produce an evidential trust value,
Tevd, from the observation. Then we evaluate the attraction of Tevd following
the approach described above in the evaluation of recommendations8. The
production of the evidential trust value exploits the close relation between
trust and risk, and in particular the fact that select() is a bijective function
(see section 3.1). More speciﬁcally, we choose as Tevd, the trust value, Ti
that is associated to the risk proﬁle, Ri, in which the observation, Obs has
the highest likelihood:
Tevd = select−1(Rmax | PrRmax(Obs) = max
i
(PrRi(Obs))) (10)
If we follow this approach, then it should clear that considering a single
observation means that Tevd does not oﬀer signiﬁcant insight into the trust-
worthiness of the principal in question. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
8 Note that we can take the view that the recommendation adjustment does in fact
produce an evidential trust value, which is subsequently used in the evaluation pro-
cess.
collect a number of observations before the evaluation takes place. The col-
lected observations construct a proﬁle of observed behaviour. In this proﬁle,
the number of occurrences of each particular observation over the total num-
ber of observations under evaluation determines its likelihood. This proﬁle
of observed behaviour can be compared to the various proﬁles of expected
behaviour, i.e. the risk proﬁles. The trust value associated to the risk proﬁle
closest to the observed one, according to the risk proﬁle distance (see equa-
tion 7), is the evidential trust value. This form of observation evaluation is
demonstrated in the smart space scenario (see section 6.1).
Updating the current trust value. The ﬁnal step in the formation and
evolution process is to update the current trust value Tcurr to a new trust value
Tnew according to the attraction of the evidence. This process is carried out by
an evolve() function. Following a similar approach to the one described in [23],
there are two alternative deﬁnitions for such a function:
1. As a trust evolution function that considers a sequence of attractions in order
to produce a trust value. More precisely, assuming that AttrSeq represents
sequences of attractions:
evolve : AttrSeq → T (11)
Considering sequences of attractions instead of sets allows us to deﬁne trust
evolution functions that can distinguish the past and have ﬁxed memory.
For example, we can introduce time discounting of evidence, so that more
recent evidence counts for more, or we can drop evidence if it is considered
to distant in the past.
2. As a trust update function that considers the current trust value and an
attraction in order to produce a new trust value. More precisely, assuming
that Attr is the set of attraction values:
evolve : T ×Attr → T (12)
Trust update functions have inﬁnite memory, since all past evidence is re-
ﬂected in the trust values. This is the main reason why both application
scenarios in section 6 use a trust update function. In fact, in the e-purse
scenario (see section 6.2) the evaluate() and the evolve() function have been
merged into a single function that provided with an observation, directly
produces the new trust value from the current one. Note also that for any
trust update function we can generate a trust evolution function by iteration
starting from each initial trust value.
The exact nature of either type of evolve() function is up to the application
developers to deﬁne. When deﬁning the exact function they should consider
the work of Jonker and Treur [23], who analyse trust evolution and update
functions and identify a number of properties that such functions may have. More
importantly, each of the identiﬁed properties allows the modelling of alternative
principal attitudes towards trust. This type of modelling can also be applied to
our trust formation and evolution approach.
Following a similar approach to [23], in our collaboration model we identify
two aspects that allow us to characterise the many types of principal attitudes
towards trust. We refer to these aspects as the dispositional characteristics of a
principal. These characteristics are:
1. Trusting Disposition. In terms of trusting disposition, principals are clas-
siﬁed as either generally trusting or generally distrusting. This is reﬂected
in the initial trust value that they use for the formation process and the
selection of the glb or lub in the case of incomparable trust value during
evidence evaluation (see the section on recommendation evaluation above).
With respect to the former, a generally trusting principal would select an
initial trust value T that conveys more trust than “unknown”, ⊥ T , while a
generally distrusting principal one that conveys less trust than “unknown”,
T ⊥. With respect to the latter, a generally trusting principal would select
the lub, while a generally distrusting principal the glb.
2. Type of trust dynamics. The types of trust dynamics reﬂect how easily a
particular principal’s trust in others builds and erodes in the light of evi-
dence. In general, principals may build or erode trust either quickly, slowly,
or in balance. This means that a principal that quickly (slowly) builds trust
would require a small (large) number of positive evidence to consider another
principal as highly trusted. Further, a principal that quickly (slowly) erodes
trust would require a small (large) number of negative evidence to consider
another principal as highly distrusted, meaning that it is quite unforgiving
(forgiving) of bad behaviour. Jonker and Treur suggest in [23] such a model
of diﬀerent types of trust dynamics. Moreover, they identify the following
types:
– Blindly positive. A principal that after a number of good experiences
with another principal will always consider it trustworthy.
– Blindly negative. A principal that after a number of bad experiences
with another principal will always consider it untrustworthy.
– Slow positive, fast negative. A principal that requires a large number of
good experiences to build trust and a small number of bad experiences
to erode trust.
– Fast positive, slow negative. A principal that requires a small number of
good experiences to build trust and a large number of bad experiences
to erode trust.
– Balanced slow. A principal that requires both a large number of good
experiences to build trust and a large number of bad experiences to erode
trust.
– Balanced fast. A principal that requires both a small number of good
experiences to build trust and a small number of bad experiences to
erode trust.
In order to enable the expression of the above dispositional characteristics in
our collaboration model, we introduce dispositional parameters in the evolve()
and evaluate() functions. The exact nature of these parameters will of course
depend on the exact deﬁnition of these functions and the characteristics of the
particular application scenario. Therefore, it is up to application developers to
deﬁne them. The use of dispositional parameters is demonstrated in both case
studies in section 6. In the smart space scenario, we use a dynamic threshold
dt, which determines how quickly or slowly the system adapts to evidence (see
section 6.1). In the e-purse scenario, we use αp, αn and β that determine how
slow or fast trust builds, erodes and becomes certain respectively.
Summary. In summary, trust formation and evolution are considered very sim-
ilar. Both consist of an evidence evaluation process and an evolve trust process.
The evaluation of all evidence is in terms of its attraction. Attraction is calcu-
lated in reference to the current trust value and exploits the structure of the
trust domain and the notion of risk proﬁle distance. Furthermore, the evidence
evaluation process takes into account the type of evidence, direct or indirect,
and requires that all indirect evidence is adjusted in accordance to the trust-
worthiness of its source, thus introducing the notion trust in the recommender.
The evolve trust process could either take the form of a trust update or a trust
evolution function. The former produces a new trust value based on the current
one and the attraction of the evidence, while the latter just considers a sequence
of attractions. In both cases, the functions can be parameterised in terms of
trusting disposition and types of trust dynamics, allowing the expression of a
variety of principal attitudes towards trust.
4 The Operational Collaboration Model
In section 3 we discussed the theoretical aspects of our collaboration model,
which incorporates trust exploitation, formation and evolution. The model in-
troduced a number of processes that need to be carried out in order support trust
based decision making and evaluation. In this section, the discussion moves from
the theoretical to the operational considerations of the model. In particular, in
section 4.1 we present a trusting collaboration architecture that supports our the-
oretical model. A central component of the architecture is a store where trust
related information is kept. In section 4.2 we present a layered model for the
organisation of trust related information. This model allows us to avoid some of
the problems of managing indirect evidence reported in literature [1, 25, 28, 52].
Finally, in section 4.3 we are discussing some issues relating to collection and
distribution of evidence.
4.1 A Trusting Collaboration Architecture
In order to identify the components of our trusting collaboration architecture, we
start by focusing on the main processes identiﬁed in section 3.1, and particularly
decision making and trust evaluation. Our aim is to elaborate on ﬁgure 1 and to
show where the various processes introduced in section 3 should be positioned
against each other. Due to the complexity of the decision making and the trust
evaluation process, we have separated the two processes in ﬁgures 2 and 3
respectively.
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Fig. 2. The decision making process.
According to ﬁgure 2 the decision making process is triggered with the receipt of
a collaboration request. The request should include all necessary information to
both determine who is the requestor and the context of the collaboration. The
information included in the request is divided into requestor related and context
related information. The former allows us to recognise the requesting principal.
While, the latter will be divided into parameters for the trust contextualisation,
the select() function and the risk analysis.
Having recongised the requesting principal we retrieve its trust value using the
trust() operation on the trust box (see section 2.1). The retrieved trust value
is then contextualised taking into account the relevant context parameters. The
contextualised trust value (T ′ in the ﬁgure) together with the relevant context
parameters is used to select the appropriate risk proﬁle. The selection is carried
out by the select() function (see equation 4). Finally, the access control policy
of the decision making principal is applied to the selected risk proﬁle adjusted
by the risk parameters and a decision is made.
Comparing ﬁgure 2 to ﬁgure 1 we note the following:
– The process of interpreting the trust value for the requesting principal in the
context of the collaboration request and then using it to select the appropri-
ate risk proﬁle relates to the -function.
– The process of applying the access control policy to the selected risk proﬁles
adjusted by the risk parameters relates to the ⊕-function.
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Fig. 3. The trust evaluation process.
According to ﬁgure 3 the trust evaluation process is triggered with the production
of an observation. Note that the production of the observation requires that
a collaboration request was received, the decision was made to take part in
the collaboration, which has now been completed and its results are known. In
general, a collaboration may last for some period of time and its result may
not be known immediately after its completion. Following its production the
observation needs to be evaluated with respect to the current trust value Tcurr.
The evaluation is carried out by the evaluate() function and is either direct (see
equation 6) or indirect (producing an intermediate evidential trust value Tevd).
In either case it produces the attraction of the observation. Then, the attraction
is used to produce a new trust value Tnew. The production of the new trust value
is carried out by an evolve() function which can take the form of either a trust
evolution or a trust update function (see equations 11 and 12 respectively).
At this point we should note that the trust evaluate process is represented by
the feedback loop and the ♦-function in ﬁgure 1. Moreover, the combination of
the evaluate() and the evolve() function is equivalent to the update() function
of the trust box (see section 2.1).
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Fig. 4. The trust formation and evolution process.
Figure 3 focuses only to the evolution of trust in the light of observations. In
ﬁgure 4 we extend this ﬁgure to include also recommendations. In this case, either
the production of observations or the collection of recommendations triggers the
trust evolution process. The collected recommendations have to be adjusted,
taking our trust in the recommender into account, before they are evaluated.
The rest of the process is the same for both recommendations and observations.
At this point, we should note that in the case of trust formation, there are some
diﬀerences in the process. First, the process is triggered by the trust box realising
that there is no current trust value (Tcurr) for the principal in question. At this
stage we set Tcurr to be the the initial trust value (most likely ⊥, the bottom
element of the certainty ordering c.p.o. according to section 2.1). Second, we
either provide as the new trust value the recently set current trust value, i.e.
Tnew = Tcurr, or we initiate a recommendation collection process. In the latter
case, the formation process is almost identical to the process depicted in ﬁgure 4,
focusing though only on the collected recommendations. Note that since we have
already set the current trust value (Tcurr), then rest of the process is the same
for both trust formation and evolution.
Based on the description of the various processes depicted in ﬁgures 2, 3 and 4,
we identify the following components for our trusting collaboration architecture:
– Request Analyser. The request analyser is the front-end of the whole archi-
tecture. It receives all collaboration requests from other principals and relays
to them all decisions taken. Furthermore, it is also responsible for separating
the information included in the collaboration request into requestor related
information and context related information. The former is relayed to the
entity recognition module, while the latter is relayed to the risk evaluator.
– Trust Calculator. The main purpose of the trust calculator is to maintain
the local trust state. Note that this state is described by a local trust policy π,
which combines current local trust values and references to other principals
to provide us with trust values for speciﬁc principals. Since, the local trust
state is mutable the trust calculator should also provide us with mechanisms
to update it. Moreover, it should be aware of the structure of the trust
domain and should provide the operations over it necessary for evidence
evaluation. For example, it should provide operations that can calculate the
glb or lub of two trust values according to the trust ordering complete lattice
or the glb of two trust value according to the certainty ordering cpo, etc. It
should be clear that the trust calculator is in fact an extended version of the
trust box described in section 2.1.
– Risk Evaluator. The main purpose of the risk evaluator is to maintain
the results of the risk analysis, i.e. the risk proﬁles. This means that it is
responsible for the trust exploitation process, which includes both the con-
textualisation of the trust values and the application of the select() function.
It is also responsible for adjusting the risk proﬁles in accordance with the risk
parameters. Moreover, it should be aware of the structure of the risk domain
and should provide the operations over it necessary for trust evaluation. For
example, it should be able to calculate the distance between two risk proﬁles,
or to produce an evidential trust value using the select−1() function, etc.
– Trust Lifecycle Manager (TLM). The main responsibility of the TLM is
trust formation and evolution. It is thus responsible for evaluating evidence,
with the help of the trust calculator and the risk evaluator, to produce attrac-
tions. It is also responsible for producing new trust values using the evolve()
functions and taking into account the dispositional parameters. In addition
to the above, the TLM also provides an interface to the trust calculator
allowing it to request the formation of a trust value for new principals.
– Access Control Manager. The access control manager is responsible for
applying the access control policy to the selected risk proﬁles to make a
decision for each collaboration request.
– Collaboration Monitor. The collaboration monitor is responsible for the
production of observations. Since, an observation consists of the outcome of
the action and its incurred cost or beneﬁt, in order to produce them we need
to monitor the eﬀects of all interactions between collaborating principals.
– Evidence Gatherer. The evidence gatherer is responsible for collecting rec-
ommendations from other principals. Note that the issue of evidence gath-
ering is further discussed in section 4.3.
– Evidence Store. The role of the evidence store is to keep all trust related
information for as long as it is necessary. This information includes both the
local trust values for the various principals as well as collected evidence. Local
trust values need to be stored in order to support the trust evolution process.
Note that in in a global computing environment it would be infeasible to keep
local trust values for all principals we ever interacted with. In this case it is
important that the evidence store provides some ageing process for the local
trust values. This process can then be used to occasionally clear the store
from unnecessary information.
Collected evidence needs to be stored for both trust and risk evaluation
purposes. In the case of trust evaluation how long the evidence needs to
be kept depends on the type of evolve() function we use. If we are using a
trust evolution function then evidence needs to be kept indeﬁnitely, unless
our function speciﬁes an evidence window in which case all evidence outside
it can be discarded (see equation 11). If we are using a trust update func-
tion then evidence needs to be kept until it is taken into consideration (see
equation 12). Note that evidence is not necessarily immediately taken into
account. There is a tradeoﬀ between the cost of frequent processing evidence
and how up-to-date our local trust values are. Even if evidence might no
longer be necessary to keep for trust evaluation purposes, it might be kept
for risk evaluation purposes. In general, we would expect the risk evalua-
tion process to run less frequently than the trust evaluation one. Section 4.2
discusses some additional issues regarding the evidence store.
– Entity Recognition Module. The absence of a global principal identiﬁca-
tion scheme in the global computing environment deems traditional authen-
tication techniques problematic. To deal with these problems entity recog-
nition schemes have been proposed [43]. In general, entity recognition is a
superset of authentication. In our architecture the entity recognition module
acts as a placeholder for the module providing the functionality to support
an entity recognition scheme. This module would provide us with a local id
for all entities that we have interacted with based on the requestor related
information of the collaboration request.
Figure 5 shows how the various components described above are put together
to deﬁne our trusting collaboration architecture. The diﬀerent types of arrows
represent the diﬀerent processes as they are carried out by the architecture. Note
that in the case of decision making, the whole process is triggered by the arrival of
a collaboration request to the request analyser. In the case where the requesting
principal is not known to us, the trust calculator requests the formation of a
new trust value. This is demonstrated in the diagram by the decision making
arrow going from the trust calculator to the TLM. If the TLM decides to gather
recommendations as part of this formation process it has to contact the evidence
gatherer. The process of gathering recommendations and evaluating them as part
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Fig. 5. The overall trusting collaboration architecture.
of this formation process is demonstrated by the decision making arrows going
from the TLM to the evidence gatherer, to the evidence store and back to the
TLM. Note also in fact, that the formation and evolution processes are in fact
triggered by the collaboration monitor and/or the evidence gatherer. Finally,
the risk evaluation process also depends on the availability of evidence.
4.2 The Trust Information Structure
In section 4.1 we introduced an evidence store for trust related information, but
did not specify its internal structure. In the discussion of the store we identi-
ﬁed two types of trust related information, namely trust values and evidence.
We can take the view that trust values are in fact summarisations of previously
evaluated evidence. According to this view we could see the evidence store as
being organised into two layers, one for each type of trust related information.
Although this sort of trust information structure adequately supports the de-
cision making and trust evaluation processes, it has certain shortcomings with
respect to recommendations. The problem lies in the fact that summarising pre-
viously evaluated evidence into a single trust value results in combining both
our personal experiences of interacting with a particular principal and also the
recommendations that we have received about that principal from others. As
reported in the literature, this may lead to double counting of evidence [1, 3,
25, 28, 52]. This results when the personal experience of a particular principal is
relayed as recommendations from two diﬀerent paths. Moreover, the recommen-
dation adjustment process becomes further complicated in the presence of third
party recommendations. In order to circumvent these problems, we summarise
our personal experiences separately from the recommendations. This introduces
an intermediate layer to the structure of the evidence store. This layer includes
a trust value based solely on our personal experiences, Tobs, and a trust value
based solely on our collected recommendations, Trec. Note that top layer of the
structure still contains our overall trust value, Tov. This structure is depicted in
ﬁgure 6.
T ov
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Fig. 6. The Trust Information Structure.
In summary, the trust information structure is organised as follows:
– The base layer contains lists of evidence, i.e. observations and recommenda-
tions. This layer is updated by the evidence gatherer and the collaboration
monitor whenever a new recommendation is collected or the result of a par-
ticular collaboration becomes known respectively. Note that there might be
a ﬁxed size for these lists. If the lists have ﬁxed size, then when attempting
to add new evidence to a full list, an evidence evaluation and trust value up-
date process will be triggered. This process will result in the evidence being
summarized into new trust values for Tobs, Trec and Tov. Subsequently, the
lists may be cleared of the evaluated evidence. Note that observations and
recommendations are evaluated separately with respect to Tobs and Trec for
the update of these two values, and they are also evaluated with respect to
Tov for the update of this value. In this way, we keep our opinions based
on our personal experiences separate from our overall opinion. So, whenever
we are required to provide a recommendation, we can pass our observational
trust value Tobs as our opinion. In this way, we avoid all the above mentioned
problems.
– The second layer contains just the summaries of our personal experiences
and our collected recommendations in the form of Trec and Tobs. These sum-
maries are produced in the way we described above. Note that instead of
directly evaluating the evidence and updating the overall trust value, we
could instead use our observational trust value as our current opinion, then
consider the recommendational trust value as an evidential trust value, and
use it to produce our overall trust value. This process would be similar to
the indirect observation evaluation process described in section 3.3.
– The third layer contains just our overall trust value. This value is the local
trust value used by the trust calculator.
4.3 Evidence Gathering
Evidence gathering refers to the processes of collecting and distributing rec-
ommendations and thus refers to the functionality provided by the evidence
gatherer component of our architecture (see ﬁgure 5). There are two ways in
which recommendations may be collected, either by explicitly requesting them
(pull model) or when others are oﬀering them to us (push model). In either case,
since their value depends on our trust in the recommender, we usually do not
request or accept them indiscriminately. Finding which recommenders to accept
recommendations from is not straightforward. There are a number of approaches
we could follow:
– We could bootstrap principals with a list of similar entities that could be
likely sources of recommendations. However, it might be the case that none
of these entities can be contacted at a particular point in time.
– We could ask unknown principals to provide us with a list of entities that
could give us recommendations about them. However, this might be mislead-
ing, since no principal would recommend anyone they had a bad interaction
with.
– We could ask our neighbours to suggest good recommenders. Note that the
neighbourhood might have diﬀerent meanings. For example, it may be com-
prised of our acquaintances or directly accessible entities in an ad-hoc net-
work, etc. However, there are no guarantees that our neighbourhood is a
good source of recommendations.
– We could also introduce brokers that can suggest recommenders for various
types of interactions. In this case, these brokers play the role of trusted third
parties.
– In some situations, however, when trustworthy recommenders are not known,
a broadcasted request for recommendations might be our only option. This
approach oﬀers no guarantees whatsoever and it would probably be our last
resort.
Furthermore, in any case, accepting oﬀered recommendations indiscriminately
makes us susceptible to recommendation spamming and denial of service attacks.
When we are requested to provide a recommendation, we must bear in mind
that by doing so, we reveal personal information. This means that there might
be privacy concerns regarding the provision of recommendations. We can take
the view that our experiences are a valuable resource that we need to protect. In
this case, we could use the SECURE model to control access to our experiences.
This means that requests for recommendations are just one type of action that
our application deals with and as a result, recommendations requests trigger the
decision making process depicted in ﬁgure 2. Alternatively, we could consider our
experiences as a valuable resource, but control access to it through a separate
process. It could be argued that this alternative is preferable since it may involve
a more simple process compared to the usual decision making one.
In general, research has shown that exchange of experiences can be beneﬁcial
for a community of entities [21]. However, based on the above discussion it
might seem that entities should be inclined to avoid collecting and distributing
recommendations. For this reason, it is important that in any system where we
want exchange of experiences, that such an exchange is actively encouraged.
In other words, the system has to punish principals that do not share their
experience and reward those that do. Such behaviour may be enforced if the
trust values for the principals include an element referring to their attitude
towards experience sharing. In conclusion, the whole issue of evidence gathering
is an interesting one, and deserves further investigation.
5 A Formal Model for Trust Lifecycle Management
This section9 describes a preliminary formalisation of our trust lifecycle manage-
ment architecture described in section 4.1. The formalisation takes into account
the structure of the evidence store described in section 4.2, and is based on the a
trust policy language initially introduced in [10]. Note that when we are talking
about trust policies in this section, we in fact refer to the local trust policies
described in section 2.1.
5.1 The Trust Policy Language
In the trust policy language, policies are formally deﬁned as functions of type
P → T such that for each principal they return a trust value. The language per-
mits the speciﬁcation of these functions. A policy language has the form λx : P.τ
where τ speciﬁes the returned value of the policy, done by using certain oper-
ators. One of these operators is the operator ., called reference. For instance
the policy λx : P.a(x) speciﬁes the function that, for any principal b ∈ P,
returns a’s trust in b. References make policies dependent on the global trust
m. The function m is deﬁned as the least ﬁxed point of all policies (see [10] for
more details and formal semantics).
9 This section includes signiﬁcant contributions by Marco Carbone of BRICS, Univer-
sity of Aarhus.
The operator of reference can also be combined with other operators provided
from the language. For instance we could write a policy which says that our
trust in b is a’s trust in b but for any other principal c it will be the least upper
bound between a’s trust in c and a threshold value t:
λx : P.(x = b) → a(x); (t  a(x)) (13)
where the operator · → ·; · is semantically equivalent to an if-then-else and  is
the least upper bound (lub) in lattices.
5.2 Encoding in the Policy Language
The encoding in the policy language is done by exploiting two features: the syn-
tax of the policy and the structure of the set T . When we give a policy π written
in the language we give an algorithm for computing a function. Hence, when writ-
ing the policy, we “store” some information in the syntax of the language which
means that it is possible to record the current trust value.
Representing the various layers of the evidence store (see ﬁgure 6) could be
handled by giving more structure to the set T . Suppose that the initial set of
trust values is Tval, provided with a certainty ordering  and a trust ordering
 as required (see section 2.1. Then we can deﬁne a new set T as:
T = [EV D]× Tobs × Trec × Tov (14)
where [EV D] is a list of evidence, e.g. [evd1, . . . , evdn] ∈ [EV D] for evd1,
. . . , evdn pieces of evidence. This means that our policy contains a list of ev-
idence (as shown in the base layer of the evidence store in ﬁgure 6), and three
trust values (as shown in the second layer in ﬁgure 6): the ﬁrst refers to the
current trust value based on observations, the second refers to the current trust
value based on recommendations and the third refers to the overall current trust
value (the one used for decision making). To describe these trust values as a
policy, we will initially start from the situation where there are no observations
or recommendations. Therefore, the policy could be deﬁned as:
πa = λx : P.([],⊥,⊥,⊥) (15)
where [] is the empty list and ⊥ is the bottom of the certainty ordering (see
section 2.1.
When we have an observation, say o1, we just need to update the list of evidence
and so get a new policy as follows:
πa = λx : P.([o1],⊥,⊥,⊥) (16)
A recommendation from b about c can be represented as r1 = b(c).2, where
the operator .2 (in general .n for any natural number) stands for the projection
of the 2-nd element (in general n-th) over a tuple (in this case over the set T ).
When we have a recommendation, say r1, we also just need to update the list of
evidence and so get a new policy as follows:
πa = λx : P.([o1, r1],⊥,⊥,⊥) (17)
When we decide to consider the evidence and update our current trust value,
we get a new policy. Note that this process is triggered with the call of the
update() method on the trust box (see section 2.1). Supposing that our policy
was πa = λx : P.([o1, r1], tobs, trec, tov), and that both o1 and r1 is evidence
referring to principal c, then the new policy is as follows:
πa = λx : P.([], (x = c) → evolve(ao1 , a(x).2); tobs,
(x = c) → evolve(ar1 , a(x).3); trec,
(x = c) → evolve(ar1 ′, evolve(ao1 ′, a(x).3)); tov) (18)
where
ao1 = evaluate(o1, a(c).2), (19)
ar1 = evaluate(r1, a(c).3), (20)
ao1
′ = evaluate(o1, a(c).4) and (21)
ar1
′ = evaluate(r1, a(c).4) (22)
are the respective attractions of the observation and the recommendation 10.
For deﬁnitions of evaluate() and evolve() see equations 6 and 12 respectively.
Note that in this case, all evidence taken into account is removed from the list
of evidence. Furthermore, we only update the trust values for the subject of the
evidence, while the values for the other principals remain the same. Finally, the
evaluation and the evolution of the evidence is with respect to the corresponding
element of the T tuple, thus the need to calculate diﬀerent attractions ao1 , ao1 ′,
and ar1 , ar1
′ respectively.
Here, we should point out that both recommendation and references refer to
principals’ trust in other principals. However, as the above formalisation demon-
strates recommendation are always evaluated before the trust value evolves, i.e.
their eﬀects on our trust policy are expressed in terms of their attraction.
5.3 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this section presented a preliminary formalisation of trust lifecy-
cle management model based on the trust policy language. This formalisation
provides us with a basis for further formal analysis of our model and a ﬁrst step
towards the veriﬁcation of evidence evaluation and trust evolution algorithms.
We consider both of these issues quite important for further investigation in the
future.
10 Recommendations would usually also go through a recommendation adjustment pro-
cess.
6 Case Studies
In this section we present two case studies on our collaboration model: (a) a
smart space scenario and (b) an e-purse scenario. Both case studies demonstrate
how to engineer trust and risk domains that have the required properties set
out in section 3.1. They also present speciﬁc examples of the various functions
deﬁned in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Furthermore, they show how the disposi-
tional characteristics introduced in section 3.3 can be modelled in the evidence
evaluation and evolve trust processes.
We should note that in both case studies the emphasis is in demonstrating
the concepts of our collaboration model. As a result, aspects not relating to
our model have been signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed or even ignored. The production of
complete applications addressing in full the issues of both scenarios was deemed
to be outside the scope of this paper.
6.1 The Smart Space Scenario
In smart environments, sensors are placed in rooms and oﬃces to enable the
collection of data such as the location of the smart space inhabitants. The vast
amounts of personal information collected by such systems has led to growing
concerns about the privacy of their users. Users concerned about their private
information are likely to refuse participation in such systems.
Privacy control, as the term states, encompasses both the notion of privacy and
the notion of control. A good privacy solution should combine both of these two
notions. According to Alan Westin “privacy is the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent infor-
mation is communicated to others” [49]. Privacy on its own is about protecting
users’ personal information. On the other hand, control is about justiﬁcation of
privacy and plays a role in the management of privacy.
We consider the case of a smart environment equipped with a context informa-
tion server (CIS) that collects, stores and interprets user contextual information,
e.g. location information. Users can request to receive the information that the
CIS collects for other users. The way information is exchanged between users
classiﬁes them as information owners, those whose contextual information is
managed by the CIS, or information receivers, those who would like to use the
managed contextual information. We believe that in any context information
system, information owners may be willing to disclose their contextual infor-
mation if this disclosure is potentially beneﬁcial. Accordingly, for any context
information system to be acceptable to the information owners, it must pro-
vide mechanisms for controlling access to personal contextual information. These
mechanisms should provide ﬁne-grained control of the disclosure of personal con-
textual information in order to allow maximisation of its expected beneﬁt and
minimisation of costs.
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Fig. 7. A user requests location information from the context information server.
In this scenario we consider the case of a CIS that is able to track users, the
information owners in this case, as they move within the smart space. Users, the
information receivers in this case, can request from the CIS location information
of others with the intension to meet them. The CIS provides location information
to information receivers in the form of notiﬁcations. This allows information
receivers to track the movements of information owners for a particular period
of time or until a meeting between the information receiver and the information
owner takes place.
More speciﬁcally, as depicted in Figure 7, ﬁrst, the information receiver sends a
request to the CIS for location information regarding a particular information
owner. We assume that all users are registered with the system, and as a result,
the identiﬁcation by the CIS of both the information receiver and the information
owner is trivial. On receipt of the request the CIS needs to decide whether to
permit the tracking of the information owner. The decision is based on the
expected costs and beneﬁts of providing the information as they are perceived
by the information owner.
In general, information owners are willing to trade the cost of privacy loss re-
sulting from allowing information receivers to track them with the gains of a
beneﬁcial meeting. The cost or beneﬁt of providing their location information
depends on two parameters: the cost of tracking, which is analogous to the du-
ration of tracking, and the cost/beneﬁt of the meeting, which depends on the
outcome and the duration of the meeting. The meeting outcome could either be
beneﬁcial or not. The likelihood of the various costs and beneﬁts depends on the
trustworthiness of the information receiver. The more trusted the information
receiver is, then an interaction with him or her is more likely to be beneﬁcial.
Moreover, information owners specify a privacy policy that determines which
interactions should be permitted by the CIS, or in other words, under which
circumstances the CIS should disclose their location information. The privacy
policies set boundaries on the acceptable expected costs/beneﬁts of interactions.
These boundaries are expressed as limits on both the tracking and meeting du-
ration. Thus, in reply to the information receiver’s request and in accordance
to the information owner’s privacy policy the CIS needs to decide how many of
tracking and meeting time units it should provide to the information receiver.
As we mentioned above, when the CIS decides to provide the requested infor-
mation it starts to send location notiﬁcations to the information receiver. These
notiﬁcations can stop in two diﬀerent ways. Either the allocated tracking time
expires or the sensors detect the information receiver and information owner in
proximity of 1 meter to each other. The latter indicates that the purpose of the
request has been fulﬁlled, i.e. a meeting between the information receiver and
the information owner is taking place. Moreover, the CIS sends messages to the
information owners when the allocated meeting time is due to expire. When a
meeting is ﬁnished the information owner sends feedback to CIS regarding its
outcome. This feedback is used in the evaluation of the trustworthiness of the
information receiver.
Privacy policies. In order to increase the ﬂexibility of the privacy policies
and reduce their complexity we allow information owners to divide information
receivers into groups. For each group the information owner can set a diﬀerent
privacy policy. These policies are conﬁgured by setting the following parameters:
– Maximum tracking duration units, (mtdu). This parameter determines the
maximum time that an information receiver is allowed to track the informa-
tion owner. The time is measured in units of 5 minutes.
– Maximum meeting duration units, (mmdu). This parameter determines the
maximum time that a meeting with an information receiver is supposed to
last. This parameter helps information owners to better manage their time
by giving more time to meetings that are likely to be beneﬁcial and ones
that are likely to be a waste of time. This time is also measured in the units
of 5 minutes.
– Value of time, (vt). This parameter indicates how valuable the information
owner considers his or her time. The values for this parameter are: not so
precious, precious, and extremely precious.
– Privacy sensitivity level, (psl). This parameter determines the degree to
which information owners are concerned about their privacy. The values
for this parameter are: little concerned, quite concerned and very concerned.
For example let us consider a smart university department, where information
receivers can track the location of academic members of staﬀ (information own-
ers) to arrange meetings with them. Examples of diﬀerent groups of information
receivers could be:
– Students, which can be further divided into: general students (GS) and su-
pervised students (SS), either postgraduate students or ﬁnal year project
students.
– Academic staﬀ which can be further divided into: general member of staﬀ
(GA), and staﬀ within the same research group (RA).
– Support staﬀ which can be further divided into: system support(Sys), and
secretaries (Sec).
Table 1. A Privacy Policy Conﬁguration Example
User Group mtdu mmdu vt psl
GS 4 2 extremely precious very concerned
SS 5 5 precious quite concerned
GA 6 3 not so precious little concerned
RA 6 4 not so precious little concerned
Sys 4 2 precious quite concerned
Sec 8 2 precious quite concerned
Table 1 provides an example of the parameters that could be associated with
the various groups of users in the smart university department.
Observations. Observations are obtained when interactions are ﬁnished. These
observations reﬂect the observed cost/beneﬁt of the outcome of the interaction.
The actual cost/beneﬁt is combination of both the cost of tracking duration and
the cost/beneﬁt of the meeting duration.
The multiplication of tracking duration units by the cost per unit (tdu∗unit cost)
gives the cost of tracking. The privacy sensitivity level determines the cost of
tracking as follows:
– The unit cost could be 2, if the psl is very concerned.
– The unit cost could be 1, if the psl is quite concerned.
– The unit cost could be 0, in the psl is little concerned.
For example referring back to Table 1, if a a general students tracks a member
of staﬀ for duration of 3 units, the cost is 6 (tdu ∗ unit cost = 3 ∗ 2).
The multiplication of meeting duration units by the meeting cost per unit (mdu∗
munit cost) gives the cost/beneﬁt of the meeting. The meeting cost per unit
depends on the outcome (mo), which could either be: beneﬁcial, average or
waste of time. So, the possible meeting costs per unit could be:
– -2, if the meeting was beneﬁcial.
– 2, if the meeting was wasting time.
– If the outcome of the meeting is average, then the cost per unit depends on
the value of the time a follows:
• It could be -1, if vt is not so precious
• It could be 0, if vt is precious,
• It could be 1, if vt is extremely precious
Trust values. The decision about granting access to location information de-
pends on both the category of the user and the trust value associated to him or
her. For construction of our trust values for this scenario we deﬁne a set of basic
trust values: FD, D, N, T, and FT representing fully distrusted, distrusted, neu-
tral, trusted, and fully trusted respectively. Following the interval construction
method described in [9], we construct our application trust values by deﬁning
a certainty complete partial order with a least element and a complete lattice,
which deﬁne our certainty trust ordering respectively(see Figure 8).
[FT,FT][FD,FD] [D,D] [N,N] [T,T]
[FD,D] [D,N] [N,T] [T,FT]
[FD,N] [D,T] [N,FT]
[FD,T] [D,FT]
[FD,FT]
(a) Certainty Ordering
[FT,FT]
[T,FT]
[N,FT][T,T]
[N,T]
[N,N] [D,T]
[D,N]
[D,D] [FD,N]
[FD,D]
[FD,FD]
[D,FT]
[FD,T]
[FD,FT]
(b) Trust Ordering
Fig. 8. The Smart Space Scenario Trust Domain.
Risk analysis. The risk of an outcome is a function of the likelihood and impact
in terms of cost and beneﬁt of that outcome. The risks of the interactions in the
smart department are centered on both users’ privacy and the way their time is
exploited in meetings. Users in general are concerned both about others knowing
their location information and about how to make the best use of their time.
In order to determine the range of possible costs/beneﬁts for each outcome,
we calculate ﬁrst the maximum costs/beneﬁts. The calculation is based on the
functions for calculating the tracking and meeting costs/beneﬁts provided above
in section 6.1. The total maximum cost combines the maximum cost of both
tracking and a meeting by using the maximum tracking duration units (mtdu)
and the max meeting duration units (mmdu). In calculating the total maximum
beneﬁt, we will only consider the maximum beneﬁt of a meeting since there is
no direct beneﬁt from tracking.
In order to provide an insight into the risk analysis and decision making, we take
as an example the supervised student (SS) group (see Table 1 above for the policy
parameters for the group). The maximum cost of tracking by a user from this
group is (mtdu ∗unit cost) = (5 ∗ 1) = 5, where the unit cost unit is 1, since the
privacy sensitivity level for a user from this group is ‘concerned’. The maximum
cost of meeting is (mmdu ∗ unit cost) = (5 ∗ 2) = 10, where the unit cost is 2,
considering the worst outcome of the meeting, which is wasting time. As a result,
the total maximum cost is: cost of tracking+cost of meeting = 5+10 = 15. The
maximum beneﬁt of a meeting is: (mmdu∗unit cost) = 5∗−2 = −10, where the
unit cost is -2 considering the meeting outcome to be beneﬁcial. So, the range
of potential cost/beneﬁts for supervised students are from -10 to 15.
The users’ trustworthiness determines the likelihood of the various costs/ bene-
ﬁts. In this example we assume the following cost probability density functions
(cost-pdfs) for the basic trust values. To simplify the construction of the cost-
pdfs, the range of cost/beneﬁt is divided into 5 intervals and the value on top
of each column represents the likelihood of this interval of cost/beneﬁt. The
cost-pdfs corresponding to the basic trust values for supervised students are
illustrated in ﬁgure 9.
For the cost-pdfs of the trust value intervals containing multiple basic values we
average out the corresponding cost-pdfs. So, the cost-pdf for the interval [FD,N]
is the average of the cost-pdfs for [FD,FD], [D,D] and [N,N] and is depicted in
ﬁgure 10.
Decision making. From the interaction request, the CIS knows the identity of
the requestor and the group he or she belongs to and can select the corresponding
privacy policy. The next step in the decision making process is to apply the
select() function parameterised by the current trust value for the requestor (see
equation 3). This function will provide the appropriate cost-pdf. Note that in
this scenario, we only consider a single context for the trust values. As a result
trust exploitation does not require the trust value contextualisation. In the ﬁnal
step the CIS uses the selected cost-pdf and privacy policy to reach a decision.
Policies are described as functions that given the risks involved in the interaction
determine how many units of tracking and meeting duration should be provided
to the requestor. The policies in fact describe the risk that the information owner
is willing to accept. For example, if the cost-pdf predicts high beneﬁts from an
interaction, then the privacy policy will assign more units for both tracking
duration and meeting duration.
Evidence evaluation. In this scenario we follow the indirect approach to ev-
idence evaluation. So, we ﬁrst determine the evidential trust value Tevd, which
is subsequently evaluated with respect to the current trust value, using the
evalute() function (see equation 6). Finally, we determine which trust value
would have been a more accurate predictor of the observed outcome.
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Fig. 9. Risk Analysis for Supervised Students.
For example, suppose that Alice (Bob’s PhD student) has interacted with Bob
ten times. After collecting the ten observations, we can create an observed cost-
pdf. This cost-pdf can then be compared to the set of all cost-pdfs determined by
our initial risk analysis. The aim of the comparison is to determine the cost-pdf
that reﬂects most closely the observed outcomes. The trust value related to this
cost-pdf is considered to be the evidential trust value.
More speciﬁcally, let us suppose that ﬁgure 11 depicts the observed cost/beneﬁt
of ten interactions. A comparison of this cost-pdf to the set of cost-pdfs provided
by the risk analysis shows that the closest one is the cost-pdf for the [T,T] trust
value, which is considered to be the value of Tevd. Note that in order to determine
the closest cost-pdf we use the cost-pdf distance as deﬁned by equation 7. For
example, assuming the cost-pdfs for [FT,FT] and [N,FT] are as depicted in
ﬁgures 9 and 10 respectively, then their distance is: | 0 − 0 | + | 0 − 0 | + |
0− 0.05 | + | 0.1− 0.45 | + | 0.1− 0.4 | + | 0.8− 0.1 |= 1.4.
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Fig. 11. The cost-pdf of the observed outcomes.
Trust formation and evolution. The evolution of the trust values is based
on the calculation of the attraction of Tevd. We should remind the reader that
the direction of the attraction deﬁnes two sets Tσ, Tτ ⊆ T of acceptable trust
values in terms of certainty and trust respectively.
For example, suppose that Alice has just ﬁnished ten interactions with Bob
and Bob’s trust value for Alice is Tcurr = [N,N ], while the ten interactions were
evaluated as Tevd = [FT, FT ]. For Tτ , we will check the relative position of Tcurr
and Tevd on the trust lattice (see ﬁgure 8). While, Tσ is determined by checking
the relative position of the two values on the certainty complete partial ordering
(see also ﬁgure 8). According to section 3.3, the attraction of Tevd is increasing,
consequently the new trust value Tnew should be between Tcurr and Tevd, so
Tτ = {[N,N ], [N,T ], [T, T ], [N,FT ], [T, FT ], [FT, FT ]}. Similarly, the attraction
of Tevd is contradicting, since the g.l.b. of the two values is [N,FT]. Therefore,
Tσ = {[N,N ], [N,T ], [N,FT ]}. So, the new trust value Tnew should be a member
of the intersection of these two set, Tnew ∈ (Tτ ∩ Tσ) = [N,N ], [N,T ], [N,FT ].
The value of the attraction depends on the distance of the cost-pdfs of Tevd and
Tcurr.
The evolve() function depends on the distance of the cost-pdfs of the potential
trust values for Tnew from the cost-pdf of Tevd. The maximum distance for two
cost-pdfs is 2 if they are fully contradicting and the minimum distance is 0 if
they are identical. To allow the expression of dispositional characteristics of the
principal we introduce in the calculation of Tnew a dynamic threshold dt, which
determines how quickly or slowly the system adapts to evidence. The range of
potential cost-pdf distances determines the range of potential dt values from 0
to 2.
Referring back to the example above, the distances between the cost-pdf for
Tevd = [FT, FT ] and the cost-pdfs of [N, N], [N, T] and [N, FT] are 1.6, 1.4 and
1.74 respectively. From these trust values we eliminate those that the distance is
greater than or equal to the distance of Tcurr = [N,N ]. [N, FT] is such a trust
value. After the elimination, we start comparing the distance of the remaining
trust values to dt in a descending order. The ﬁrst trust value with a distance
less than dt or the trust value with the lowest distance becomes our new trust
value. So, assuming dt = 1 the new trust value will be [N, T].
Concluding remarks. In conclusion, in the smart space scenario we consider
only a single action with a single outcome that could incur a range of cost and
beneﬁts. Moreover, we only consider observations as the source of evidence. This
simpliﬁes the application of our collaboration model in a number of ways:
1. It simpliﬁes the risk analysis by allowing the use of cost-pdfs for the repre-
sentation of the risk proﬁles. The use of cost-pdfs for the representation of
the risk proﬁles enables us to use the constructive approach to trust model
development (see [9]) in our risk analysis.
2. It simpliﬁes the trust exploitation process by removing the need for contex-
tualisation of the trust values.
3. It simpliﬁes the trust evolution process by allowing the construction of ob-
served behaviour proﬁles as cost-pds in a straightforward manner. These
proﬁles can be directly compared to the cost-pdfs of the risk analysis, i.e.
expected behaviour proﬁles, simplifying the observation evaluation process.
Despite the above simpliﬁcations the scenario still demonstrates:
– how the close relationship between trust and risk can be achieved,
– how indirect observation evaluation can take place, and
– how dispositional parameters can be used to inﬂuence the trust evolution
process.
6.2 The e-purse Scenario
The scenario involves the use of an e-purse when a passenger is interacting with
a bus company. The purpose of the e-purse is to hold a relatively small amount
of e-cash (in this scenario the e-purse is limited to 100 euro) that the owner can
use as if it were real cash for buying bus tickets (see ﬁgure 12).
Fig. 12. E-purse scenario interaction.
Users can reﬁll their e-purse by contacting their bank provided that there is
enough cash in their account. There are three diﬀerent principals involved in this
scenario: the passenger (owner) of the e-purse, the bus company and the bank. In
this scenario we are only interested in modelling the trust relationship between
the bus company and the passenger. We consider the example interaction where
passengers want to purchase tickets using their e-purse.
E-cash is based on a protocol that although it protects user anonymity during
normal transactions, enables identiﬁcation of guilty parties in fraudulent trans-
actions. Every time the bus company accepts e-cash in a transaction it takes the
risk of losing money due to fraud. Therefore, for the bus company to decide how
to respond to a purchasing request, it needs to determine the trustworthiness of
the passenger. Principals can assign diﬀerent levels of trust to diﬀerent entities
based on the available information so as to evaluate the level of risk transactions
involving the user entail.
Trust values. In the e-purse scenario the range of basic trust values is [0, 100]
reﬂecting the amount of e-cash that the bus company is willing to accept from
the requesting user. Following the interval construction technique from [9], we
construct our trust values as intervals [d1, d2] of the range of basic trust values.
An interval [d1, d2] indicates that the bus company is quite certain about the
validity of amounts up to d1 of e-cash , fairly uncertain about the validity of
amounts between d1 and d2 and fairly certain that any amount above d2 will be
invalid. So, for any ticket purchasing request of more than d2 the user has to
pay in cash. It should be clear that the use of such trust values really simpliﬁes
the decision making process.
Risk analysis and decision making. The essential step in trust exploita-
tion is to determine expected behaviour on the basis of trust intervals. This is
achieved by using the trust interval to determine the risk of interacting with
a particular principal. The assumption is that the passenger’s trustworthiness
reﬂects the expected loss or gain during a transaction involving him or her. The
costs involved in an interaction range from -100 to 100, denoting the maximum
gain or loss for the bus company.
In the general case, the calculated risk allows entities to decide whether or not to
proceed with an interaction. In this scenario, a simpliﬁed view is taken, whereby
the trust value directly determines the amount of e-cash a bus company is will-
ing to accept. The decision making process for a ticket of value x regarding a
passenger with trust value [d1, d2] is as follows:
– If x < d1 then the whole amount of the transaction can be paid in e-cash.
– If x > d2 then the option of paying in e-cash is not available and the full
amount has to be paid in cash.
– If d1 < x < d2 then the likelihoods of the possible outcomes are examined.
Note that there are only two possible outcomes, the e-cash provided by the
passenger will be either valid or invalid. For the calculation of the likelihoods,
we divide the range from d1 to d2 into a number of units, n. For example
n could be equal to the price of the cheapest ticket, say 5 euro. In this
case, the number of units is determined by dividing the whole range over
ﬁve (d1 − d2)/5. The likelihood of invalid e-cash for each unit is (m/n),
where m = 0, 1, .., n (see ﬁgure 13). Note that the likelihood of invalid e-cash
increases from d1 (with a probability of 0 for invalid e-cash) to d2 (with
a probability of 1 for invalid e-cash). Considering these likelihoods for the
possible outcomes the bus company can place a threshold of acceptable risk.
So, it will only accept e-cash for transaction with risk below the threshold.
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Fig. 13. Risk Analysis.
Trust evolution. In this scenario we again only consider observations and we
combine the two processes of trust evolution, namely evidence evaluation and
trust evolve. As a result, the attraction of every observed outcome, whether the
provided e-cash were valid or not, raises or drops the boundaries of the current
trust value Tcurr.
In accordance with section 3.3, if the e-cash was valid then the attraction of the
observation is considered positive, in which case we expect the lower and upper
bound of Tcurr to either remain unchanged or to be raised. While, if the e-cash
was invalid the attraction of the observation is considered negative, in which
case we expect the lower and upper bound of Tcurr to either remain unchanged
or to be dropped. Moreover, if the outcome was expected, i.e. its likelihood was
more than 50%, then the attraction of the observation is considered reinforcing,
otherwise is considered contradicting. Let us assume that m1 and m2 are the
movements of the lower and upper bound of Tcurr respectively. Then, in the case
of reinforcing attraction we expect the size of the interval (d2 − d1) to remain
unchanged or be reduced, i.e. m1 > m2. While, in the case of contradicting
attraction we expect the size of the interval to remain unchanged or be increased,
i.e. m1 < m2. This is summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of observation evaluation.
attraction direction direction of boundary movement interval size
positive, reinforcing −→ m1 > m2
positive, contradicting −→ m1 < m2
negative, reinforcing ←− m1 > m2
negative, contradicting ←− m1 < m2
For example, let us assume that t denotes the amount of e-cash in the observed
transaction and Tcurr = [d1, d2)]. Then, the movements m1 and m2 of the lower
and upper bound of Tcurr could be determined as follows:
1. If t < d1, then
– If the e-cash is valid, then the attraction is reinforcing and positive.
In this case, the observation does not really contribute any additional
information about the principal and is therefore ignored, i.e.:
m1 = 0 and m2 = 0 (23)
Note that if we do not ignore this kind of observations, but instead use
them to raise the trustworthiness of the principal, then we are exposing
ourselves to the typical trust exploitation scum, where a large number of
very small value transactions could allow a transaction of a substantial
value to take place even though there is no evidence to support this
decision.
– If the e-cash is invalid, then the attraction is contradicting and negative.
In this case:
m1 = αn × (t− d1) and m2 = β ×m1 (24)
2. If t > d1, then
– If the e-cash is valid and the likelihood of t being valid is less than 50%,
Pro(t, valid) < 50%, then the attraction is positive and contradicting.
In this case:
m1 = αp × (t− d1)× (1− Pro(t, valid)) and m2 = 0 (25)
– If the e-cash is valid and the likelihood of t being valid is greater than
50%, Pro(t, valid) > 50%, then the attraction is positive and reinforcing.
In this case:
m1 = β ×m2 and m2 = αp × ((100− d2)/(d2 − t))× (1− Pro(t, valid))
(26)
– If the e-cash is invalid and Pro(t, invalid) > 50%, then the attraction is
negative and contradicting. In this case:
m1 = 0 and m2 = αn × (t− d2)× (1− Pro(t, invalid)) (27)
– If the e-cash is invalid and Pro(t, invalid) < 50%, then the attraction is
negative and reinforcing. In this case:
m1 = αn× (d1/(d1− t))× (1−Pro(t, invalid)) and m2 = β×m1 (28)
Note that αp, αn and β range from [0, 1] and are dispositional parameters that
determine how slow or fast are the positive, negative and certainty dynamics
respectively. If αp > 0.5 then we are talking about fast positive dynamics, while
if αp < 0.5 we are talking about slow positive dynamics. Similarly, depending
on the value of αn we are talking about fast negative or slow negative dynamics.
Moreover, if αp = αn then we are talking about balanced slow or fast dynamics
(see section 3.3). At the same time, if β is small we reduce the size of the trust
interval quickly, while if β is large we reduce it slowly.
A speciﬁc example. Suppose that a passenger with a trust value [20, 70] paid
valid e-cash worth 40 euro to the bus company. Supposing that the range between
20 and 70 is divided into 5 units each with a size of 10, the likelihoods of the
two outcomes, valid or invalid e-cash, are: 40% for invalid and 60% for valid.
So, the attraction of this observation is positive and reinforcing. Applying the
functions described above, we have m1 = 8, m2 = 0. So, the new trust value
Tnew = [d1 + m1, d2 + m2] = [20 + 8, 70 + 0] = [28, 70].
Concluding remarks. In conclusion, in the e-purse scenario we only consider
a single action with two outcomes, valid or invalid e-cash. We also only consider
observations. As a result, we remove the need for contextualisation of the trust
values. The trust and risk domains are designed in a way that makes decision
making quite straightforward. In contrast to the smart space scenario, the eval-
uation of observations is direct. In fact, the evidence evaluation and evolve trust
processes have been merged into into a single process that directly updates the
current trust value (see equations 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28).
7 Comparison to the State of the Art
In the previous sections, we have discussed our collaboration model in terms of
making decisions and evaluating these decisions. In this section we compare our
work to the state of the art in trust management. The comparison is in terms of
the following factors:
– The complexity of the trust domain and the decision making process. We
are particularly interested in the modelling of uncertainty and risk, as well
as the relation between trust and risk. We are also interested in the way in
which situational aspects of trust are modelled, i.e. context modelling.
– The provision of trust lifecycle management, which incorporates trust for-
mation, evolution and general dynamics of trust. Of particular interest are
the types of evidence used, how this evidence is gathered, evaluated and
whether the diﬀerences between direct and indirect evidence are taken into
account.
– The support for the expression of diﬀerences in principal attitudes towards
trust, i.e. dispositional character of principals.
We begin this section with a brief look at the origins of trust management in
credential based systems in section 7.1, before concentrating on evidence based
systems in section 7.2. Evidence based systems are of interest since their dynamic
nature is more appropriate for the global computing environment.
7.1 Credential Based Trust Management
Matt Blaze et al. [6] were the ﬁrst to deﬁne trust management, as “a uniﬁed
approach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials and rela-
tionships that allow direct authorisation of security-critical actions”. In such
trust management systems, trust is viewed implicitly through the delegation of
privileges to trusted entities via the use of credentials or certiﬁcates, which can
be chained to represent the propagation of trust between entities. Requestors of
a service can prove directly that they hold the correct credentials to authorise
the requested service. Examples of this type of trust management system are [6,
5, 14, 27, 42, 30]. From its origins in [6], this model has been extended in various
ways. The formation of trust relationships have been enhanced through dynamic
credential discovery [14, 31] and trust negotiation for the bilateral exchange of
credentials [42]. Further reasoning about evolution of relationships has been en-
abled through logic based approaches [29] and the ability to prohibit, constrain
or even revoke delegations [27].
Despite such advances, these approaches are unsuitable for the global comput-
ing environment, primarily due to the implicit notion of trust. As a result, there
is no consideration of risk or uncertainty, which are important characteristics
of such an environment given the lack of complete knowledge of the system.
Moreover, the basic model only describes a way of exploiting established trust
relationships for distributed security policy management, without determining
how these relationships are formed. The fact that policy is evaluated with re-
spect to delegated credentials means that if the necessary credentials cannot be
discovered, the trust relationship does not exist and access cannot be granted.
This is a real problem for the formation and evolution of trust relationships
in an environment where network connectivity is not always guaranteed. These
types of problems are typical of credential based trust management systems.
The only way they can be resolved is with the introduction of an explicit notion
of trust, accompanied by the notion of evidence. Evidence enables formation
and evolution of trust relationships based on the outcomes of past interactions.
Given these limitations of the credential based approach to trust management,
henceforth we concentrate on evidence based approaches.
7.2 Evidence Based Trust Management
In recent years there have been attempts at more intuitive computational models
of trust, with a basis in the history of past interactions. Examples of such work
include [1, 13, 16, 19, 23, 26, 28, 32, 41, 46, 33, 50, 52], which constitute an improve-
ment over credential based trust management. However, based on our discussion
in section 3 some limitations still exist:
– Most systems use ﬁxed trust domains (e.g. [1, 26, 28, 32, 52]). This can ham-
per the ﬂexibility of the trust model for diﬀerent applications.
– Few incorporate a notion of uncertainty to deal with partial information or
the introduction of new unknown entities (e.g. [26, 52]).
– Few include detailed risk analysis or clearly model the relationship with trust
[16, 19], usually incorporating only an arbitrary risk threshold (e.g. [13, 32,
46]).
The rest of this section focusses on the most important of the evidence based
trust management systems and highlights their most interesting aspects.
Stephen Marsh [32] was the ﬁrst to formalise the notion of trust for computa-
tional use, taking into account trust disposition and even a limited notion of
context in situational trust. Furthermore, the notion of risk is incorporated to
provide a threshold for trusting decision making, demonstrating the relationship
between trust and risk, although perhaps simplistically. Simple linear equations
allow the formation of trust values in the range [-1, 1). This simple trust domain,
however, cannot represent uncertainty, and coupled with the simple linear equa-
tions, caused some counter-intuitive outcomes in certain cases of trust evaluation.
In our model, the use of more complex functions operating over an application
speciﬁc partially ordered trust domain negates these problems. In [32], trust
evidence observed from past interactions comes in the form of payoﬀ values,
in a game theoretical sense. While this allows for limited evolution of trust, a
comprehensive approach with more detailed evidence, allowing propagation and
deeper evaluation would be more useful in terms of evolution. This is one of the
strongest features of our model.
Later work in evidence based trust management looked further into the use of
direct experience and its eﬀect on trust dynamics. In section 3.3 we referred
to the work by Jonker and Treur [23] on the formalisation of trust dynamics.
This is interesting formal work regarding the formation and evolution of trust in
light of personal experience, providing a framework able to capture a variety of
dynamic models. Each event that can inﬂuence the degree of trust in a subject
is interpreted as either trust negative or trust positive, similarly to our notion of
attraction. However, our model also operates on the basis of a certainty dimen-
sion and allows information to be propagated in a weighted manner. The work
caters for initial trust disposition and trust dynamics, in line with our formation
and evolution concepts. The trust domain is represented by a partially ordered
set of trust qualiﬁcations, T, which may be qualitative, quantitative or some
dimensional variant, in line with the ﬂexible nature of our trust domain. How-
ever, the certainty ordering requirement of our domain enhances the model for
the global computing environment. This framework is not meant as a coherent
approach to trust management, but rather an analysis of trust dynamics and
as such exploitation for decision making is not addressed, nor are the issues of
context and risk.
In section 3.3 we discussed the need for types of evidence other than direct ex-
perience for evaluating trust in a principal within a decentralised environment.
Abdul-Rahman et al. [1] propose a decentralised approach to trust manage-
ment incorporating distinct trust levels and dynamics. The work focuses on the
formation of trust based on recommendations and experiences, rather than ex-
ploitation. The decision making process is not detailed, and as such, a notion
of risk is not considered. At any given time, trust in an agent is evaluated from
the relevant subset of experiences for a context. Similarly to our approach, an
experience is the result of either evaluating an interaction or relying on a rec-
ommendation from an agent. In [1], experience takes a value corresponding to
the trust degree, such that the experience value that has occurred most fre-
quently in past interactions dictates the level of trust. A notion of uncertainty
is incorporated, for situations where there is no single most frequent experience
value. In our model, however, the notion of attraction of experience permits more
complex dynamics to be modelled, and certainty is reﬂected to some degree in
every trust value in the domain. Furthermore, we can use this certainty, coupled
with risk analysis, when deciding about collaboration with unknown entities.
This permits experience to be gained, rather than bootstrapping with arbitrar-
ily trusted experiences and recommendations. An important contribution of this
work is the adjustment of recommendations based on the ‘recommender trust’
that weights recommendations based on ‘semantic distance’ of experience from
recommendation. In the development of our adjustment operator for trust in
the recommender we will be examining similar approaches. In Abdul-Rahman’s
work, a recommendation can be direct or a lead to a recommender, which means
that chains, and the inherent problem they bring in terms of discounting, can
be omitted by contacting the ﬁnal recommender directly. This element may be
of use to us in developing our approach to recommendations.
Other trust management systems have addressed the issue of ﬁnding leads to rec-
ommendation sources, through neighbourhoods of known entities, as discussed in
section 4.3. An example of this is Kinateder and Rothermel [28], who describe a
distributed reputation system for trust building in an online environment. Mod-
els represent trust in entities in various categories of expertise and algorithms
are described for calculation and update of trust based on experiences. Each
user has a local copy of the system’s trust and knowledge models. The Trust
Model has trust values in the range [0, 1] for a set of categories, and a conﬁ-
dence vector that stores meta-information such as number of direct experiences
and number of indirect experiences from semantically related categories, deter-
mined by a directed dependency graph with weighted vertices. The Knowledge
Model is a way of creating a local proﬁle of ‘who knows what’, including local
knowledge, enabling advertising personal expertise and locating recommendation
sources. Recommendations can be exchanged and combined through neighbour-
hoods and can be evaluated against personal experience by the user. Updating
trust in each category uses the old trust value for the recommender, the new ex-
perience (inﬂuenced by an ageing factor), the recommender’s conﬁdence in the
recommendation and a notion of semantic distance of the trust category. This
combination of trust information from semantically diﬀerent categories of exper-
tise is akin to the context mapping issues discussed in 3.2. However, problems
arise due to the chosen trust domain and lack of dispositional aspects. Setting
initial trust in unknowns to 0 is not satisfactory, as this can also imply previous
bad experience. As our model incorporates certainty this is not an issue as we
can give the unknown value to newcomers.
Another system based on the notion of neighbourhoods is proposed by Yu and
Singh [52]. Their trust model for large open systems of agents uses distributed
reputation management. Each agent maintains a model for each acquaintance,
with information on their ability to act in a trustworthy manner and refer to
trustworthy agents. The representation of trust is based on Dempster-Shafer
theory [44], showing belief, disbelief and uncertainty, formed and evolved by
combination of evidence. Two types of belief are distinguished in the model, lo-
cal belief based on user evaluation of direct interactions and total belief, which
combines local belief with testimonies from witnesses. This is in line with our
separation of Tobs and Tov in the trust information structure in section 4.2. The
local belief can be used to establish trust in acquaintances, and neighbours can
be queried for testimonies (or referral to testimonies) to allow formation on an
initial opinion in an unknown agent. However, without a notion of disposition, it
is unclear what happens in the case of an agent unknown to any recommenders.
The set of referral chains returned by a testimony query can be combined by
Dempster’s rule of combination to give the total belief. This is then be com-
pared to a threshold for decision making, although the nature of this process is
unspeciﬁed. The agent can then become an acquaintance when we gain direct
experience with it through interaction. Only local belief is propagated, as total
belief could create non-well-founded cycles. This is consistent with our reason-
ing behind the trust information structure in section 4.2. However, in [52], it is
stated that as more evidence is gathered, uncertainty in the belief that the agent
is trustworthy is reduced. This is inconsistent with our view that evidence which
contradicts much of the historical trend should make us less certain, a factor
incorporated in the certainty dimension of attraction in our model.
We have acknowledged throughout this document that uncertainty is key to
representation of trust in the global computing environment. One of the main
contributions in this area is Jøsang’s work on Subjective Logic [26, 24], which op-
erates on subjective beliefs (opinions) using standard and non-standard logical
operators. An opinion is a probability measure containing uncertainty, repre-
sented by a belief model similar to Dempster-Shafer Theory [44]. Aside from
the ability to represent uncertainty, the interesting aspects of this work are the
two non-traditional operators. These allow discounting of recommended opinions
based on an opinion of the advice (referred to in section 3.3) and reaching con-
sensus between two opinions based on the same facts, as if an imaginary entity’s
opinion represented both. Such an operator could be utilised in calculating a
combined opinion for evaluation. Furthermore, an alternative representation of
uncertain probabilities with respect to the evidence space is deﬁned using prob-
ability density functions, based on the amount of evidence supporting the event
and its negation. A mapping is easily deﬁned between the evidence space and
the opinion space to allow the use of results from one in the other. Moreover, the
combination of evidence from two observers forms the basis for the opinion space
consensus operator. This can be seen as a link between risk, i.e. behavioural pro-
ﬁles, and the trust domain. However, our view of risk incorporates a range of
possible outcomes, not just a binary view. Furthermore, our model retains uncer-
tainty throughout the decision and evaluation processes, across the relationship
between trust and risk.
We have seen that few trust management systems provide for detailed risk anal-
ysis. In addition to Jøsang’s work above, Grandison and Sloman [19, 20] also
contribute in this area with their general-purpose trust management system.
SULTAN is a logic based notation with associated tools for speciﬁcation, analysis
and management of trust relationships for Internet applications. Trust relation-
ships, or speciﬁcations, with constraints and trust values are deﬁned in a policy
language. Recommendations can also be deﬁned as policies, used to deﬁne new
trust relationships. It is up to the trustor to decide if a recommendation is ac-
cepted, although there is no process for adjusting based on trust in source, which
is an important part of our model. There are several interesting components of
SULTAN. A Monitoring Service updates a central store with state information
for the scenario and system, experience information for direct alteration of trust
levels, and risk information for analysis through a Risk Evaluation Service. The
view is taken that a trust speciﬁcation may depend on risk, deﬁned as a proba-
bility of a transaction failing, such that higher risk means less trust, although the
detailed risk analysis is not addressed. A Trust Analysis component evaluates
the trust and recommendation speciﬁcations to determine conﬂicts and implicit
relationships, although the exploitation of these relationships is not addressed
as it is dependent on speciﬁc purpose. Evidence evaluation is not deﬁned further
in this work, resulting in limited evolutionary capabilities. A notion of context is
deﬁned as the set of actions to which a trust level applies, and a set of constraints
that must be evaluated for the trust relationship to apply. This diﬀers somewhat
from our model, where contextualisation also occurs during exploitation rather
than just in the evaluation of evidence.
The notion of context is very important for trust based decision making, as
we discussed in section 3.2. There are other trust management systems which
address this issue. One good example is Xiong and Liu’s PeerTrust [50, 51], an
adaptive trust model for P2P e-commerce communities. The basic trust model is
based on transaction service satisfaction feedback, collected and distributed by
a feedback system. Interestingly, feedback to the evaluation process is weighted
according to the number of transactions that contributed to it as well as the
feedback source. This means that the amount of information aﬀects the decision.
In our model, we take a more integrated approach, by deﬁning certainty as a
property of our trust domain. This certainty can change based on the evaluation
of evidence against the trend of previous behaviour, encoded in the current trust
value. Certainty can therefore be considered directly in both the decision and
the evaluation processes. In Xiong and Liu’s work, two further adaptive trust
factors are deﬁned for feedback, transaction context for aggregating feedbacks
from several transaction types, and community context to account for speciﬁc
community characteristics. A general trust metric for calculating trust in a peer
over a speciﬁc period is given, which allows further weighting of transaction vs.
community characteristics. Thus the metric may be adapted by the developer if
community characteristics form an important part of the decision process. The
trust value can be exploited for comparison of peers or to determine whether to
transact with a speciﬁc peer on the basis of a decision rule, such as comparison
with a threshold of trust. However, the decision process does not incorporate
a notion of risk analysis or the disposition of the entity. Furthermore, personal
observations are not treated separately from the evidence of other peers and
cannot be implicitly trusted regardless of one’s own reputation. The manner
in which credibility of source is established is not strictly speciﬁed, although
it is suggested that this might be done using a function of the trust value for
the peer or feedbacks on feedbacks. This would introduce a notion of trust in
recommender, which our model currently incorporates. Furthermore, in this work
there is a limited view of trust evidence as user rated satisfaction of service and
initial trust formation in unknowns not addressed.
Concluding remarks In this section, we have highlighted the shortcomings of
other trust management systems for the global computing environment. In con-
trast, we provide a comprehensive general framework, incorporating the gath-
ering and evaluation of detailed observational evidence, and the propagation
of source-weighted recommendations in a context aware fashion to incorporate
a range of opinions. While most systems use ﬁxed trust domains, our ﬂexible
trust representation allows a domain to be deﬁned for a particular collaborative
application. Moreover, the requirements for both trust and certainty orderings
facilitate both evaluation and decision making in a more realistic way than do-
mains with no notion of certainty. Furthermore, this notion of certainty allows
us to deal with unknown entities when they are introduced to the system. This
problem is further addressed in our model through the use of dispositional char-
acteristics. In contrast to much of the work highlighted here, we model a close
relationship between trust and risk, retaining the certainty dimension through-
out exploitation of trust for detailed risk analysis in decision making. This rela-
tionship is also invaluable for evaluation of the decisions we make, allowing our
model to provide more appropriate observational evidence to the trust evaluation
process than many other systems. Furthermore, as we separate the gathering of
information from policy fulﬁlment a lack of information will not lead to policy
violations, as would happen in credential based systems. An added advantage of
this is that evidence can inﬂuence a variety of decisions, contributing to decision
making in a variety of contexts. The limited evidence and evaluation thereof in
other systems leads to limited evolution capabilities. We can examine patterns
of historical behaviour rather than just separate pieces of evidence, and by using
the attraction, essentially allow all the history to remain at some level within
the trust values, albeit with depleting inﬂuence over time.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In conclusion, this appendix builds upon the previously deﬁned SECURE the-
oretical trust model [9] and risk model [3] to deﬁne a collaboration model ad-
dressing the dynamic aspects of the trust lifecycle. The model relies on the
close relationship between trust and risk, which is expressed as a bijective func-
tion select() (see equation 3) from the trust to the risk domain. This function is
utilised both in the decision making and the trust evaluation process, which view
trust as a way of classifying principals according to their expected behaviour.
More speciﬁcally, in the decision making process, the function allows us to pro-
duce a proﬁle of expected behaviour, i.e. risk proﬁle, based on the trustworthiness
of a principal. In the trust evaluation process, it allows us to calculate the trust-
worthiness conveyed by a proﬁle of observed behaviour and subsequently update
our opinion about the trustworthiness of a principal. An interesting observation
is that if the two processes rely exclusively on this function, then the risk do-
main must have a structure similar to the one that the theoretical trust model
requires from the trust domain. This leads to the introduction of the notion of
uncertainty in the risk domain.
The SECURE collaboration model addresses the following dynamic aspects of
the trust lifecycle:
– Trust exploitation, which is the interpretation of trust values in context for
the purposes of decision making, and
– Trust formation and evolution, which is the revision of the trust values in
the light of available evidence starting from complete lack of evidence in the
case of unknown principals.
Trust exploitation acknowledges the situational character of trust, which recog-
nises that principals may behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent situations. Subsequently,
context is deﬁned as a situational modiﬁer of principals behaviour (see deﬁni-
tion 1). Context can be modelled as a set of parameters that aﬀect either the
trustworthiness of principals, or the proﬁles of their expected behaviour, or even
the operation of the select() function. In the context of a simple collaboration,
these parameters include the action in question and the requester. Context can
also be divided into internal, intra-application, and external, inter-application
one. The latter will require some process of translation or mapping for transfer
between applications.
Trust formation and evolution are considered very similar processes. They both
receive some evidence, which they evaluate in relation to the current trust value
to produce a new trust value. The main diﬀerence between them is the use of
an initial trust value, most likely “unknown”, in the case of formation. Evidence
is classiﬁed as either direct or indirect. The former is considered a fact and its
value is unquestionable. While the value of the latter depends on the trustwor-
thiness of its source and as a result requires appropriate adjustment before its
consideration. Direct evidence takes the form of observations, the outcome of an
action and its incurred cost or beneﬁt, and indirect the form of recommendations,
the recommender’s trust value for the subject. The evaluation of evidence is in
terms of their attraction, the eﬀect they have on the current trust value and is
carried out by an evaluate() function (see equation 6). Attraction characterises
evidence as either positive or negative in terms of trustworthiness and as either
reinforcing or contradicting in terms of certainty. Although recommendations
are only evaluated directly through a comparison of their value to the current
trust value, observation can be evaluated either directly or indirectly. The latter
case, ﬁrst obtains an evidential trust value, which can then be evaluated in the
same way as recommendations. The update of the current trust value is carried
by an evolve() function, which can either take the form of trust evolution or a
trust update function (see equations 11 and 12 respectively). These functions
also allow the room for principal speciﬁc conﬁguration according to its dispo-
sitional characteristics, which take the form of trusting disposition and type of
trust dynamics.
The operational considerations of the collaboration model include:
– The deﬁnition of a trusting collaboration architecture that supports decision
making, trust evaluation and risk evaluation (see ﬁgure 5). Important ele-
ments of the architecture include a collaboration monitor and an evidence
gatherer that collect observations and recommendations respectively, an ev-
idence store that maintains trust related information, both evidence and
trust values, and a trust lifecycle manager responsible for the evaluation of
evidence and the update of the current trust value.
– The deﬁnition of a layered architecture for trust related information, called
the trust information structure (see ﬁgure 6). The main characteristic of this
architecture is the separate evaluation of the trustworthiness of principals ac-
cording to direct and indirect evidence. This separation avoids the problems
of double counting evidence in the case of recommendations.
– A discussion of the problems associated with the selection of recommenders,
where a number of alternative approach are presented.
The formal model for trust lifecycle management uses a policy language for de-
scribing the local trust policies of principals to describe the trust formation and
evolution process. The formalisation assumes that evidence is organised accord-
ing to the trust information structure. An interesting result of the formalisation
is that it clariﬁes the diﬀerence between references and recommendations. They
both refer to other principals’ trust values of a subject with the diﬀerence that
only the latter are evaluated, i.e. the way they are taken into consideration
depends on their evaluation in terms of attraction.
The two case studies, the smart space scenario and the e-purse scenario, are only
provided as examples of how the collaboration model can be applied. They both
focus on the engineering of a trust and risk domain that has the appropriate
characteristics so that the decision making and the trust evaluation processes
can completely rely on the select() function. Moreover, both scenarios provide
examples of speciﬁc evidence evaluation and trust update functions.
Finally, a comparison to the state of the art shows that our collaboration model
takes into consideration all the issues highlighted in the literature, and improves
on the current state.
8.1 Future Work
Although, this appendix describes a quite extensive collaboration model for SE-
CURE, there are still a number of areas that require further work and investi-
gation. Future work can take a number of directions. The ﬁrst priority would
certainly be an evaluation of the various aspects of the model. We are in the
process of developing a simulation framework to assist us in this evaluation. The
starting point in this process is to simulate the two case studies presented in
section 6. We also plan to use this simulation framework to investigate desirable
properties that our evidence evaluation and trust update functions must exhibit.
The areas that require further investigation in the order that we plan to examine
them are:
1. Recommendation adjustment. In order to have a fully operational collabo-
ration model it is essential that we develop an recommendation adjustment
operator. A promising starting for this investigation is the notion of semantic
distance introduced by Abdul-Rahman and Hayes [1].
2. A detailed model of context. Currently, the discussion about the introduction
of context in the collaboration model is still quite high level. As a next step
it is necessary to develop a more detailed model of context for trusting
collaborations.
3. A collaboration model for non-simple collaborations. Currently, our model is
focusing only on simple collaborations, between only two principals involving
just a single action. An important extension of our model would be towards
multi-principal and multi-action collaborations.
4. An investigation into collaboration monitoring and evidence gathering. The
aim of such investigation would be to develop a general collaboration monitor
and a set of algorithms for evidence propagation.
5. The relation between trust and risk. Regarding this relationship from a the-
oretical point of view a possible avenue of investigation could be the devel-
opment of a uniﬁed model of trust and risk. This model would certainly have
to include a model for uncertain risks that will build upon our preliminary
approach. On the same issue and from an engineering point of view, it would
be interesting to investigate the relative advantages and disadvantages of the
alternative approaches suggested. This investigation could subsequently be
developed into a methodology for developing trusting collaboration applica-
tions.
In conclusion, we believe that although the model described in this appendix is
a considerable step towards a complete model for trusting collaboration, there
is still a long way to go.
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